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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
as it is an appeal from a final judgment of the district court which has been transferred by
the Supreme Court.
II.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Has Graham failed to demonstrate that any of the trial court's findings

which he attacks in his brief are clearly erroneous?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court will not disturb the trial court's Findings of Fact
unless Graham demonstrates the findings are clearly erroneous. Bonneville Distributing
Co. v. Green River Dev. Assocs., 2007 UT App. 175, \ 18, 164 P.3d 433.
2.

Has Graham failed to demonstrate that the trial court's award of punitive

damages was clearly erroneous.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The court will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact
unless Graham demonstrates the findings are clearly erroneous. See, Bonneville, supra.

1

3.

Is Graham barred from raising the argument for the first time on appeal that

paragraph 9 of the Agreement between the parties does not permit an award of attorney's
fees in this case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue presents a question of law. See, Moore v. Smith,
2007 UT App. 101,124, 158 P.3d 562.
a.

Even if Graham is entitled to raise the issue set forth in paragraph 3

above for the first time on appeal, has Graham failed to demonstrate that the trial court's
determination that Burton Lumber is entitled to attorney's fees under paragraph 9
constituted error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue raises an issue of law that is reviewed for
correctness. See, Canyon Meadows Homeowners Assoc, v. Wasatch County, 2001 UT
App. 414,^7, 40 P.3d 1148.
b.

Has Graham failed to demonstrate that the amount of attorney's fees

awarded by the trial court is clearly erroneous?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court will not disturb the trial court's Findings of Fact
unless Graham demonstrates the findings are clearly erroneous. See, Bonneville, supra.
4.

Has Graham failed to demonstrate that the trial court's finding that Burton

Lumber is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-

2

56 because Graham's claims and defenses in this action were without merit and asserted
in bad faith was clearly erroneous?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court will not disturb the trial court's Findings of Fact
unless Graham demonstrates the findings are clearly erroneous. See, Bonneville, supra.
5.

Has Graham failed to demonstrate that the determination made by the trial

court on summary judgment that section 7.4 of the Agreement is not unconscionable
constituted error?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court reviews a summary judgment for correctness.
Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 2003 UT 43, \ 14, 79 P.3d 922.
6.

Is Burton Lumber entitled to recover its attorney's fees and costs incurred

on appeal?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue raises a question of law. Utah Dep't. of Social
Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197-1198 (Utah App. 1991).
III.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES RULES AND REGULATIONS

None.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case And Course of Proceedings Below.
In March 2001, Burton Lumber acquried Graham's wall panel business, Advanced

Homes Systems ("AHS"), and hired Graham as General Manager of the wall panel plant
as an at-will employee. [Pi's Ex. 5; Finding 3] In August 2001, Burton Lumber
discovered that Graham had stolen a Hamlet Homes check belonging to Burton Lumber
in the amount of $7,293 and then lied about the check to conceal his theft. [Findings 1118] Accordingly, on August 28, 2001, Burton Lumber terminated Graham's employment.
[Finding 18] Under the Agreement pursuant to which Burton Lumber purchased
Graham's business, Graham was entitled to receive 50% of the net profits earned by the
business during 2001, 2002 and 2003. [Pi's Ex. 5] However, upon termination of his
employment, Graham's right to receive a share of profits (none were ever earned)
terminated. [Id.$7A]
After Graham's termination, Burton Lumber learned of other dishonest conduct
committed by Graham and commenced this action to recover the amount owed by
Graham. [R. 13] Graham filed an answer and counterclaim. [R. 29] Graham later filed
an amended counterclaim. [R. 209] Burton Lumber subsequently filed an Amended
Complaint. [R. 697]

4

In August 2003, Burton Lumber filed a motion for partial summary judgment. [R.
1071] On January 12, 2004, Judge Claudia Laycock issued her ruling granting the motion
for partial summary judgment with respect to Graham's counterclaims for
unconscionability and fraud. [R. 2382] Thereafter, Partial Summary Judgment was
entered by Judge Fred D. Howard, to whom the case had been assigned. [R. 2390]
The remaining claims of the parties were tried to the court over eight days
commencing November 15, 2004. The trial court then issued its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law [R. 2978] and entered Judgment [R. 2981] in favor of Burton
Lumber on its Amended Complaint (except for its fraud and improper reimbursement
claims) and dismissed all of Graham's counterclaims. The trial court also ruled that
Burton Lumber was entitled to attorney's fees and punitive damages in amounts to be
later determined. [Id.]
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, attorney's fees were left for resolution after
the court had decided the claims of the parties. An evidentiary hearing on attorney's fees
and punitive damages was held on June 29, 2006. [R. 3112 & 3354] The trial court then
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [R. 3334] and a Supplemental
Judgment [R. 3336] awarding Burton Lumber attorney's fees in the amount of
$164,461.25 and punitive damages in the amount of $34,000. [R. 3334-3336] The

5

Supplemental Judgment was entered on September 6, 2006. Graham filed his Notice of
Appeal on October 5, 2006. [R. 3343]
Graham filed his original 209 page Appellant's Brief on July 6, 2007, together
with a motion for overlength brief. This court struck Graham's brief and denied the
motion. Graham subsequently filed a 189 page brief which improperly incorporated
argument and a 58 page statement of 122 issues, which this court also struck. Finally,
Graham filed a 113 page brief which incorporated the same statement of issues. The
court declined to strike this brief, but ruled Burton Lumber need only respond to the
arguments properly raised and briefed in Graham's argument section.
B.

Statement of Facts.
Without saying so, and without identifying and dealing with the trial court's

specific findings, Graham's brief challenges almost all of the trial court's Findings of
Fact without even attempting to marshal the overwhelming evidence supporting those
findings.1 Accordingly, as demonstrated in section A of the Argument section below, the
court assumes the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Nevertheless, Burton

1

Indeed, Graham fails to even include a copy of the Findings of Fact in his
Addendum as required. Instead, Graham, incredibly enough, includes 21 unreceived
exhibits in his Addendum without even arguing that these exhibits were erroneously
excluded at trial. Obviously, the court should not consider these unreceived exhibits.
6

Lumber quotes below the relevant findings (which are included in Addenda A & B) and
provides record citations to evidence which supports each finding:2
FINDINGS OF FACT
Burton Lumber's Purchase of the Wall Panel Plant
1.
Graham owned and operated as a sole proprietorship a wall panel business
in Provo, Utah that he started in 1995. Graham did business under the name of Advanced
Home Systems ("AHS"). [R. 3348 at pp. 1680 & 1685]
2.
AHS manufactured wall panels for residential housing at AHS's plant. The
wall panels would then be installed at the job site by subcontractors. [Id. at 1680; R.
3343 at pp. 364-365; R. 3344 at pp. 120-121]
3.
Burton Lumber acquired Graham's wall panel business pursuant to an
Agreement (the "Agreement") effective February 28, 2001. [Pi's Ex. 5] [R. 3344 at p.
99] The Agreement closed on March 19, 2001, at which time Burton Lumber took over
ownership and operations and Graham became General Manager of the wall panel plant.
[R. 3344 at pp. 112-121; Pi's Exs. 7, 9 & 10] Under the express terms of the Agreement,
Graham was an employee-at-will and could be terminated without cause at any time.
Graham also signed a separate acknowledgment so stating. [Ex B to Pi's Ex. 5] [R. 3344
at p. 104-105]
4.
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Burton Lumber agreed to pay
Graham $54,175.00 for the fixed assets of the business. [Pi's Exs. 5 & 7; R. 3344 at pp.
102 & 113-114] Burton Lumber also paid Graham approximately $4,400.00 for his
inventory. [Pi's Ex. 9; R. 3344 at pp. 114-115] Burton Lumber also agreed to pay
Graham a $120,000.00 salary (which included a guaranteed $15,000 quarterly bonus) and
fifty percent of any future net profits earned by Burton Lumber in the wall panel business
during 2001, 2002 and 2003 up to a maximum purchase price of $500,000.00. [Pis's Ex.
5}

2

The court cited a number of supporting exhibits in its findings. The record
citations now provided by Burton Lumber are set forth in italics.
7

5.
Graham actively negotiated the provisions of the Agreement with Burton
Lumber. For example, Graham refused to agree to a non-competition provision unless he
was paid substantial additional compensation for an agreement not to compete. Burton
Lumber refused to pay additional compensation and a non-competition provision was
deleted from the final Agreement. [R. 3344 at pp. 95-96 & 104-106; R. 3350 at pp. 19651966]
6.
In negotiating the Agreement, Graham was advised both by an attorney and
aCPA. [R. 3350 at pp. 1965-1966]
Graham's Misrepresentations re. Profits
7.
During negotiations of the Agreement, Graham represented to Burton
Lumber that he had earned $250,000 a year net profits from AHS. . . .[R. 3344 at p. 97; R.
3343 at p. 434]
8.
During negotiation of the Agreement, Burton Lumber requested that
Graham provide financial statements to substantiate the profits he had earned operating
AHS. Graham said he would do so, but then told Burton Lumber that his accountant was
behind and financial statements were not yet prepared. Graham did not provide Burton
Lumber with any financial statements or other financial documentation to substantiate his
representations as to the profitability of AHS. [R. 3344 at pp. 97-100]
9.
The only documents that Graham has that would substantiate the profits
AHS had earned are his tax returns. Nevertheless, Graham refused for many months after
Burton Lumber requested production of the tax returns in this case to produce any of his
tax returns. [R. 595-596] Graham only produced his tax returns after Judge Claudia
Laycock granted Burton Lumber's motion to compel, ordered Graham to produce them
and awarded sanctions against him for his refusal to produce the tax returns. Graham's
tax returns reflect that he never earned any profits from AHS over and above a meager
salary for his labor. His income from AHS ranged from a high of $33,582.00 in 1995 to a
low of $7,384.00 in 1998. For 2000, his income was $27,434.00. [Pi's Exs. 47 thru 52]
The court finds in accordance with the testimony of Burton Lumber's expert, Scott Stuart,
whose testimony the court finds persuasive, that Graham's wall panel plant business was
unprofitable for the six years prior to Burton Lumber's purchase of the business and that
the business had no value other than the value of its fixed assets at the time Burton
Lumber purchased the business. [R. 3345 at pp. 687-689]

8

10. Graham's misrepresentations regarding the profitability of his business
were material and were relied upon by Burton Lumber in purchasing Graham's business.
However, given all the circumstances, including Burton Lumber's resources, business
experience, sophistication and opportunity, its reliance upon such misrepresentations was
not reasonable. Instead of waiting for the requested verification of Graham's represented
profits, Burton Lumber completed the transaction relying upon Graham's representations
and its own limited research into the profitability of the wall panel business. Burton
Lumber made no further attempts to verify the profitability of the business until after the
lawsuit was commenced. Burton Lumber had every opportunity to discover Graham's
fraud by reviewing Graham's financial records.
Graham's Theft of the Hamlet Check
11. Hamlet Homes ("Hamlet") was one of the Burton Lumber wall panel
plant's largest customers. After Burton Lumber acquired AHS, Hamlet continued to send
Purchase Orders for wall panels to AHS and to make its checks for payment of the wall
panels to AHS. Graham would then pick up the checks from Hamlet's office and endorse
them over to Burton Lumber. [R. 3344 at pp. 123, 207 & 210]
12. As of late July 2001, Burton Lumber's records reflected that Hamlet had
failed to make payment on two Burton Lumber invoices, Nos. 2800092 and 2800093, for
wall panels supplied for lots 20 and 22, Kelvin Grove Subdivision in Springville. Burton
Lumber contacted Hamlet concerning these invoices. Hamlet informed Burton Lumber
that it had in fact paid the invoices. Hamlet provided Burton Lumber with the front and
back of the check by which payment had been made. [Pi's Ex. 25; R. 334 at p. 122] The
payment in the amount of $7,293.00 was paid to AHS on May 15, 2001. Graham picked
up the check at Hamlet's office on that date and cashed it at his bank on June 1, 2001.
[Pi's Ex. 25; R. 3344 at pp. 124-125; R. 3350 at p. 1975]
13. When Burton Lumber's President, Dan Burton, first discussed the Hamlet
check with Graham, he stated he did not know what happened with the check and was
researching the check. [R. 3344 at p. 123] Graham then told Klay Clawson, a Burton
Lumber employee, that Graham may have left the check in his pocket and his wife had
mistakenly cashed the check. In her deposition, Graham's wife denied that she had ever
found any checks in Graham's clothes and cashed them. [R. 3344 at pp. 214-215]
14. After investigation, Burton Lumber determined that Graham himself had
endorsed the Hamlet check and cashed it at Wells Fargo Bank on University Avenue in
9

Provo. He had then taken $2,000.00 of the cash and immediately deposited it into his
wife's account. The balance was deposited into Graham's account. [R. 3344 at p. 125]
Graham was ultimately forced to admit that he cashed the check and deposited the
proceeds in his account and his wife's account. [R. 3350 at p. 1985]
15. Graham has contended for the first time after this case was filed that the
work on Lots 20 and 22 was done before Burton Lumber took over the wall panel plant
and that he was entitled to keep the check. [R. 3344 at pp. 141-144 & 214-218; R. 3347
at p. 1390] However, the $7,293.00 Hamlet check for wall panels supplied for Kelvin
Grove lots 20 and 22 clearly belonged to Burton Lumber as demonstrated by the time line
contained in Plaintiffs Ex. 72:
(a) Burton Lumber took over the operation of the wall panel plant on March
19, 2001. [See, e ^ , Pi's Exs. 7, 8, 9 & 10] [R. 3344 at pp. 112-121] At that time, all
AHS business was to immediately cease and all business was to be conducted by Burton
Lumber. [Pi's Ex. 5, ^[1.9] All business done commencing March 19, 2001 was Burton
Lumber business done for its benefit. [R. 3344 at p. 116]
(b) Hamlet's records show that lot 20 was not even sold until March 26, 2001
and the house selections that the Hamlet buyer would have had to make before any wall
panels could be ordered or produced were not made until either March 28 or March 29,
2001. [Pi's Ex. 17] [R. 3343 at pp. 244-246]
(c) Hamlet's records show that lot 22 was not sold by Hamlet until March 17,
2001 and the house selections the buyer would have had to make before wall panels could
be ordered or produced were not made until March 27, 2001. [Pi's Ex. 18] [R. 3343 at
pp. 246-247]
(d) Hamlet's Purchase Orders sent to AHS for wall panels for lots 20 and 22
were dated April 16, 2001, long after Burton Lumber acquired AHS. [Pi's Exs. 12 & 13]
[Pi's Exs 17 & 18; R. 3343 at pp. 244 & 245-254]
(e) Hamlet purchased the lumber for the wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 from
Anderson Lumber which did not even deliver the lumber and materials that the wall panel
plant used for the wall panels until April 27, 2001. [Pi's Exs. 19 & 20]
(f) The wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 were not erected on site until May 3,
2001. [Pi's Ex. 16] [R. 3343 at pp. 340-343]
10

(g) Burton Lumber maintained a log of work orders for wall panels in the wall
panel plant under Graham's supervision and control. Those work orders reflected that
lots 20 and 22 were Burton Lumber jobs. Graham reviewed these work orders on an
ongoing basis and never took the position that lots 20 and 22 were AHS jobs even though
he did have the log revised to delete two jobs that were not Burton Lumber jobs. [Pi's
Exs. 21 & 22] [R. 3345 at pp. 543-549]
(h) Klay Clawson ("Clawson") prepared Burton Lumber's invoices to Hamlet
for lots 20 and 22. [Pi's Ex. 19, Bates No. B04389; Pi's Ex. 29, Bates No. B04401] He
received the information to prepare the invoices from Graham who did not tell Clawson
that on May 1, 2001 Graham had signed the Hamlet Purchase Orders and submitted them
to Hamlet to obtain payment for lots 20 and 22 or that Graham was paid $7,293.00 for
these jobs on May 15, 2001, and embezzled the money. [R. 3344 at pp. 211-214]
16.
The court finds Graham's testimony with respect to the Hamlet check (and
in other areas) to be unreliable and lacking in veracity and credibility. Instead of telling
Dan Burton and others at Burton Lumber that he cashed the check when he clearly knew
he had done so and knew the check belonged to Burton Lumber, Graham made up false
excuses and sent Burton Lumber on a wild goose chase to track down the check. [R.
3344 at pp. 123 & 214-215; R. 3347 at p. 1390] Graham's testimony that he worked on
wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 before receiving any purchase orders is implausible and
inconsistent with the other evidence and is rejected by the court. [See, Findings 15 & 18]
Graham's excuse that he did not remember cashing the check is disingenuous.
Graham's Termination
17.
After learning of Graham's dishonesty, Dan Burton decided to terminate
him but did not want to do so immediately to avoid any adverse effect on a customer's job
in progress in Nauvoo, Illinois. [R. 3344 at pp. 138-139 & 141]
18.
On August 28, 2001, Dan Burton and Jeff Burton, President and Vice
President of Burton Lumber, respectively, met with Graham at Burton Lumber's offices
in Salt Lake City. At that meeting, after first contending that he thought the money
belonged to him for a job done on Lot 703, Graham admitted cashing the Hamlet check,

3

Graham admitted in his deposition that when he picked up the $7,293 Hamlet
check he knew it related to Lots 20 and 22. [R. 3350 at p. 1976]
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that the money belonged to Burton Lumber and that he owed Burton Lumber $7,293.00
for that check. Graham stated that he would repay Burton Lumber that amount on August
31, 2001, three days after the meeting. Graham also agreed to turn in the next day the
company truck he was using. Burton Lumber terminated Graham at the meeting effective
immediately. [See Pi's Ex. 39] [R. 3344 at pp. 141-144; Pi's Exs. 38 & 39] Burton
Lumber acted in good faith in terminating Graham based on its good faith and reasonable
belief- - consistent with the court's finding - - that Graham had embezzled the Hamlet
check. [R. 3344 at pp. 138-139 & 141; Pi's Ex. 43, 44 & 45; R. 3348 at pp. 1656-1651]
Graham's explanations to Burton Lumber concerning the check were inadequate and
incredulous. Following termination, Graham fabricated the story that the check rightfully
belonged to him for his work on Lots 20 and 22. [R. 3344 at pp. 141-144 & 127-137;
Pi's Exs. 72, 19 & 20] Burton Lumber did not terminate Graham to avoid paying him a
share of the wall panel plant profits (of which there were none). [R. 3344 at pp. 138-141]
Although Graham was an employee-at-will and could be terminated at any time without
cause [Pi's Ex. 5,% 7.1 and Ex. B; R. 3344 at pp. 104-105; R. 3350 at p. 1962], Burton
Lumber had just cause for terminating him for dishonesty. [See, Findings 11-16 & 18]
Burton Lumber's decision to terminate Graham was not based on any advice or
recommendation from International Profit Associates. [R. 3344 at pp. 138-141] Graham
did not repay the $7,293.00 or turn in the company truck as promised. [R. 3344 at pp.
151-152] Burton Lumber was later able to repossess that truck. [Id.]
19. Under the Agreement, Graham was entitled to keep the truck Burton
Lumber leased for him and to receive title to the truck if he was terminated "without just
cause." [Pi's Ex. 5, \7.2] Because Burton Lumber terminated Graham with just cause
[See, Findings 11-18], Graham had no right to the truck after he was terminated.
20.
Under paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement [Pi's Ex. 5], if Burton Lumber
terminated Graham with or without cause his right to receive any further share of the
panel plant profits immediately terminated. A provision more favorable to Graham had
been included in the earlier drafts of the Agreement, but was changed when the noncompetition provision was deleted. [Pi's Exs. 1 &2,\ 7.4; R. 3344 at pp. 104-105]
Graham unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a $100,000 payment from Burton Lumber
if he were terminated for cause. [Pi's Ex. 4, Bates No. G00046, ^ 7.4]
21.
Graham was not concerned with the termination provision contained in
paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement because if he were terminated he intended to immediately
go into business for himself next door and "run them [Burton Lumber] out of business."
[R. 3344 at pp. 104-106]
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22.
On September 5, 2001, shortly after Graham was terminated, Burton
Lumber's General Counsel, Robert Burton sent Graham a letter stating that Burton
Lumber proposed to apply Graham's final salary check in the amount of $1,451.43
toward the $7,293.00 owed by Graham to Burton Lumber on the Hamlet check and that if
Graham disagreed with Burton Lumber doing so to notify Mr. Burton. [Pi's Ex. 40]
Graham did not object and thereby acquiesced in Burton Lumber crediting his salary
check to his debt. [7?. 3344 at p. 151] Graham is entitled to a credit for the amount of the
final salary check against the $7,193.00 owed on the Hamlet check. Thus, the net
principal amount owed by Graham on the Hamlet check is $5,841.57.
23.
Graham was not entitled to a third quarter 2001 bonus. That bonus would
have only accrued at the September 30 end of the third quarter and was not payable until
October. [Pi's Ex. 5, \12] Graham had already been terminated before that date. [R.
3344 at pp. 141-144] Under paragraph 7.2 of the Agreement, Graham had to still be
employed by Burton Lumber at the time a bonus was due to receive a bonus. Further,
under paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement [Pi's Ex. 5], if Burton Lumber terminated Graham
with or without cause, his right to receive any bonus terminated.
24.
Even if Graham had not been terminated, Burton Lumber's wall panel plant
did not earn any profits in which Graham could have shared. Burton Lumber's wall panel
plant lost $50,645.86 in 2001, $49,390.90 in 2002 and $227,570.87 in 2003. [Pi's Exs.
43, 44 & 45] [R. 3348 at pp. 1656-1657]
The Phony Jason Current Invoice for $2,148.00
25.
After Graham was terminated, Burton Lumber learned of another dishonest
act that Graham had committed. Unbeknownst to Graham's superiors at Burton Lumber,
Graham had purchased a generator to personally rent to contractors on Burton Lumber
jobs where there was no temporary power. Graham caused Burton Lumber to include a
rental charge for the generator in its bid on the "Bowen job" and collect for the generator.
Graham then approached Jason Current ("Current"), a subcontractor who installed wall
panels for Burton Lumber, and had him phony up on a rush basis an invoice to Burton
Lumber for $2,148.00 for work on the Bowen job that Current admitted he was not
involved in and for work that Current did not in fact perform. [Pi's Exs. 26 & 42]
Graham caused Burton Lumber to issue a check to Current for $2,148.00 the next
business day. [Pi's Exs. 27 & 42] Graham gave the check to Current and instructed
Current to simultaneously give Graham a check for the $2,148.00, which Current did.
[Pi's Exs. 28 & 42] [R. 3344 at pp. 153-156; R. 3343 at pp. 365-375; Pi's Ex. 42A]
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Although Graham has attempted to contend that he and Current were partners, Current
was not a partner of Graham's in renting generators and never agreed to any such
relationship. Graham received the entire $2,148.00, did not pay Current any portion of
the profit and did not use the money to purchase any other generator in which Current
would have an interest. [Id.] Graham did not request or receive permission from Burton
Lumber to rent generators on Burton Lumber jobs and Graham's superiors at Burton
Lumber had no knowledge he was doing so. [R. 3344 at pp. 153-156; R. 3343 at p. 447]
By this subterfuge, Graham received a secret profit of $2,148.00 on a Burton Lumber job
and usurped a corporate opportunity of Burton Lumber. [Id.; R. 3343 at pp. 365-378;
Pi's Exs. 27, 28,42 &42A]
•k k k

Graham's Conversion of Burton Lumber's Personal Property
27. Under the Agreement, Burton Lumber acquired all of the assets of the wall
panel business except accounts receivable and personal assets of Graham such as his
"home, furniture, cars, and clothing." Graham was supposed to make a list of all of the
assets. [Pi's Ex. 5, Tfl[l.l and 1.6] Rather than making a list of all of the assets, Graham
listed what he informed Burton Lumber were the main assets of the business for which he
was paid by Burton Lumber and informed Steve Hawkes that all other business assets
were included. [See Asset Schedule attached as an exhibit to Plaintiffs Ex. 5] [R. 3343
at pp. 435-436; R. 3344 at pp. 100-104; R. 3347 at pp. 1417-1419] Graham set the total
value of these assets at $54,175 and Burton Lumber agreed to and did pay that value as
fair value of all of the fixed assets. [R. 3344 at pp. 103-104; R. 3347 at pp. 1420-1421]
The court finds the testimony of Dan Burton and Steven Hawkes in this regard
persuasive.
28.
After Graham was terminated, he took possession of and converted the
following items belonging to Burton Lumber outlined in Burton Lumber's Ex. 63:
k k k

These items belonged to Burton Lumber under the Agreement. [See PI's Ex. 5; Finding
27] Consequently, Graham unlawfully converted these items and Burton Lumber is
entitled to recover their value in the amount of $7,517.59. [R. 3345 at pp. 565-579; Pi's
Ex. 63A]
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Burton Lumber's Alleged Conversion of Graham's Personal Property.
29.
Burton Lumber did not convert any personal property owned by Graham.
Burton Lumber owned all of the personal property that Graham left at the wall panel plant
premises when he was terminated, including the personal property listed in Plaintiffs Ex.
29 that Graham contends was converted. [See, Findings 27 & 28] In this regard, Dan
Burton and Steve Hawkes conceded that Graham's Gooseneck trailer and van were not
part of the sale and Graham was entitled to those items. [R. 3344 at pp. 101-102; R. 3343
at p. 437]
The Notice to Vacate
30.
Under the terms of the Agreement, Burton Lumber agreed to assume all of
Graham's ongoing obligations under his lease with the landlord for the panel plant. [PI fs
Ex. 5, f 3.3] Although Burton Lumber decided not to have the lease assigned to it,
Burton Lumber did in fact assume and pay Graham's ongoing obligations under the lease,
including the monthly lease payments. [R. 3344 at pp. 111-112; R. 3347 at pp. 14721474]
31.
On September 7, 2001 (ten days after he was terminated), Graham served a
Notice to Vacate on Burton Lumber, giving Burton Lumber notice of his demand that
Burton Lumber vacate the panel plant premises no later than October 1, 2001.
32.
The Notice to Vacate was invalid because Burton Lumber had assumed all
of Graham's obligations under the lease with the landlord, including the obligation to pay
rent until expiration of the lease and had the corresponding right to occupy the premises
until expiration of the Lease. [See, Finding 30] Thus, Burton Lumber was not a monthto-month tenant. Nevertheless, Burton Lumber wanted a bigger plant with a better
location anyway and, after receiving the Notice to Vacate, decided to vacate the panel
plant as soon as it could locate alternative space to operate the business. [R. 3344 at pp.
152-153]
33.
Klay Clawson, who was then the manager of the wall panel plant, told
Graham that Burton Lumber would not be able to vacate for a few weeks after October 1.
Graham told Clawson that was okay and thereby agreed that Burton Lumber could have a
few weeks after October 1 to vacate the premises. [R. 3344 at pp. 223-224]
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34.
Burton Lumber subsequently found alternative space and vacated the panel
plant on October 25, 2001. [R. 3344 at pp. 152-153]
35.
Burton Lumber paid the landlord the monthly lease payment on the panel
plant for October 2001 in the amount of $1,705.29. [Pi's Ex. 46] Graham never tendered
this payment back to Burton Lumber. [R. 3350 at p. 1947]
36. Graham failed to prove that he suffered any damages or the amount of
damages suffered by virtue of Burton Lumber remaining in the premises until October 25,
2001.
37. Burton Lumber did not do any damage to the panel plant. Any damage to
the panel plant had been done by AHS before Burton Lumber acquired the panel plant.
[R. 3345 at pp. 562-563; R. 3346 at pp. 801-802] Moreover, at the time Graham claims
damage was done to the panel plant, he was the General Manager of the plant and
responsible for its care and maintenance. He had the duty as General Manager to ensure
that the plant premises were properly maintained. [R. 3350 at p. 1991] There was no
evidence that Graham reported any damage to his superiors at Burton Lumber or caused
his employees to repair damages he now claims they did under his supervision.
The Six Other Hamlet Jobs Graham Claims Were for the Account of AHS
38.
Graham contended for the first time long after this lawsuit was filed that
Burton Lumber owed him money on six Hamlet jobs in addition to Lots 20 and 22 that
Graham claims were AHS jobs. [R. 3344 at pp. 141-146; R. 3345 at pp. 548-549; R.
3347 at p. 1391] These jobs are the following: Muirfield Lot 443, Glen Eagles Lots 109
and 114, and Shetland Meadows Lots 36, 70 and 82. Graham himself received all but one
of the Hamlet checks on these jobs and endorsed and/or delivered the checks to Burton
Lumber. [R. 3350 at pp. 1971-1974] Graham never contended that these jobs were AHS
jobs until months after he was terminated. [R. 3344 at pp. 141-146; R. 3345 at pp. 548549; R. 3347 at pp. 1390-1391] The court concludes that each of these jobs was in fact a
Burton Lumber job and that Graham is not entitled to recover any sums relating to these
jobs. [Pi's Exs. 21, 22, 73, 55-60 & 64-70]
39.
Each of the six jobs was included as a Burton Lumber job on the Burton
Lumber work order log that was maintained under Graham's supervision and direction
and that he reviewed on an ongoing basis. [Pi's Ex. 21; R. 3345 at pp. 543-549] Graham
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never deleted these jobs even though he changed the log to delete two other jobs that did
not belong to Burton Lumber. [Id.]
40.
Plaintiffs Ex. 73, which is a time line summarizing the relevant dates with
respect to these jobs, plainly demonstrates that these lots were Burton Lumber jobs . . . .
[See, e.g., Finding 15(a); Pi's Exs. 5, 7-77, 55-56 & 58-59; R. 3350 at pp. 1966 & 1948,
1971 & 1973-1974; R. 3343 at pp. 248-249 & 348; R. 3344 at pp. 222-223]
Punitive Damages
41.
The court finds that in embezzling the Hamlet check, obtaining the secret
profit from the rental of his generator and converting Burton Lumber's personal property,
Graham acted fraudulently, willfully, maliciously and with the intent to damage Burton
Lumber or in reckless disregard of Burton Lumber's rights. [Findings 7-9, 11-16, 18,25
& 27-28] Therefore, punitive damages should be awarded against Graham in an amount
to be determined by the court at a future hearing. [7?. 3329-3327]
[The Following Punitive Damages Findings Were Entered After Hearing on the
Amount of Punitive Damages] [See, Addendum B]
13.
Graham's current annual income is approximately $40,000. Graham's tax
returns introduced into evidence at the attorneys' fee hearing reflect that his annual
income was $60,654 in 2001; $33,065 in 2002; $61,943 in 2003 and $57,548 in 2004.
His net worth is approximately $12,000 according to Graham's testimony. [7?. 3354 at pp.
157-158; PVs Ex. 1 at evidentiary hearing]
14.
The nature of Graham's dishonest conduct and the facts and circumstances
surrounding that conduct as described more fully in the court's previous Findings of Fact
entered in this action are reprehensible especially given the fiduciary duties that Graham
owed to Burton Lumber as the General Manager of its wall panel plant. Graham stole
from Burton Lumber and then lied about his theft and made up preposterous lies and
excuses to attempt to conceal his dishonesty. Graham then forced Burton Lumber to
incur very substantial attorneys' fees to defend Graham's frivolous counterclaims, which
Graham asserted in bad faith, and in order to recover the monies owed by Graham to
Burton Lumber for theft of the Hamlet Homes check, the phony Jason Current invoice
paid by Burton Lumber and Burton Lumber's personal property stolen by Graham. [See,
Findings 7-18, 25 & 27, supra]
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15. Not only was Burton Lumber forced to incur very substantial attorneys'
fees, but Graham's dishonesty and wrongful prosecution and defense of this lawsuit
forced Burton Lumber management and employees to spend hundreds of hours to defend
against Graham's counterclaims and support the claims asserted by Burton Lumber
against Graham. This time included preparing for and appearing at numerous lengthy
depositions taken by Graham, assembling, analyzing and producing many thousands of
pages of Burton Lumber documents and preparing for and testifying at trial. [R. 3354 at
pp. 165-166]
16. The court finds there is a probability that Graham may engage in dishonest
business conduct in the future. Graham testified falsely at trial concerning his actions.
[See, Findings 11-18, supra] Graham has never apologized to Burton Lumber for his
actions. [R. 3354 at p. 164]
17. The actual principal amount of the damages awarded to Burton Lumber
with respect to Graham's dishonest conduct was $16,958.00.
18. It is reasonable to award punitive damages against Graham in the amount of
$34,000.00, or approximately two times the actual damages awarded against Graham.
Attorney's Fees
42.
provision:

Paragraph 9 of the Agreement contains the following attorney's fee

Indemnity. All of the representations, warranties, and covenants in this
Agreement and the obligations of the parties with respect thereto shall
survive the Closing. Seller agrees that he will indemnify, defend, protect
and hold harmless Buyer and its employees from and against all liabilities,
claims, damages, actions, demands, assessments, adjustments, penalties,
losses, costs and expenses whatsoever (including court costs and attorneys'
fees) that arise as a result of or incident to the following: Occurrences
before the Closing Date; any breach of, misrepresentation in, untruth in or
inaccuracy in the representations and warranties by Seller; non-fulfillment
or non-performance of any agreement, covenant or condition on the part of
Seller made in this Agreement or an [sic] any other document delivered
pursuant to this Agreement. [PI's Ex. 5]
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43.
With the exception of Graham's defense to Burton Lumber's
misrepresentation of profits and reimbursement of personal expense claims, Graham's
claims and defenses in this action are without merit and were asserted in bad faith. [See,
Findings and Conclusions generally] [R. 3333-3329]
[The Following Findings Were Entered After Hearing on the Amount of Attorney's
Fees]
1.
Burton Lumber incurred attorneys' fees in prosecuting its claims and
defending the counterclaims asserted by Graham in this action in the amount of
$164,933.75. [R. 3066-3065, f 2] Burton Lumber incurred additional attorneys' fees of
$6,027.50 with respect to the hearing on the amount of attorneys' fees and punitive
damages and preparation of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental
Judgement with respect thereto. [R. 3286] Thus, the total attorneys' fees incurred by
Burton Lumber in this action is the amount of $170,961.25. This amount is exclusive of
attorneys' fees incurred by Burton Lumber with respect to its fraud claim against Graham
which was dismissed by the court.
2.
In support of its claim for attorneys' fees, Burton Lumber presented the
affidavit [R. 3066, 3100 & 3286] and testimony of its lead counsel, Richard D. Burbidge
[R. 3354 at pp. 24-147], and all of its billing records. [R. 3060, et seq.] Burbidge &
Mitchell's time records are kept by attorneys at Burbidge & Mitchell by hand and then
those time records on cases are typed up as the billing statement. There is no additional
detail in the time records kept by individual attorneys other than what is included in the
bills. [R. 3354 at pp. 46-48]
3.
When this case was originally filed, Robert Burton represented Burton
Lumber and expended a substantial number of hours representing Burton Lumber in this
case with respect to which Burton Lumber is not claiming any reimbursement. [R. 3354
at p. 23; R. 3366-3062]
4.
The normal hourly rate charged by Richard D. Burbidge for legal services is
$350.00 per hour. The normal hourly rate of Stephen B. Mitchell charged for his legal
services is $310.00 an hour. [R. 3065, ^ 2] Messrs. Burbidge and Mitchell performed the
vast bulk of the legal services performed for Burton Lumber in this action. Nevertheless,
Burton Lumber was billed and paid for their legal services at the substantially reduced
rate of $200.00 per hour based upon the relationship between Burbidge & Mitchell and
Burton Lumber. [R. 3065, ^ 2] Graham obtained the benefit of this substantially reduced
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billing rate. The time of associates and paralegals at Burbidge & Mitchell was billed at
their normal rates ranging from $40.00 to $165.00. [See, Billing Statements R. 3060, et
seq.; R. 3354 at pp. 59-60]
5.
The legal services performed by Burbidge & Mitchell on behalf of Burton
Lumber and the legal fees incurred with respect thereto were necessary, reasonable and
appropriate. Both the hourly rates and the amount of attorneys' fees charged by Burbidge
& Mitchell to Burton Lumber in this action were reasonable and customary according to
the custom and practice in both Salt Lake County and Utah County considering the
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of Burton Lumber's counsel in presenting the
case, the expertise and experience of the attorneys representing Burton Lumber and the
result obtained, including successfully defending the counterclaims asserted by Graham
against Burton Lumber of approximately $1.5 Million. [R. 3063-3062; R. 3354 at p. 26]
In this regard, the amount of attorneys' fees incurred by Burton Lumber was substantially
increased as a result of Graham's litigation strategy, including the taking of numerous
lengthy depositions, requesting and receiving many thousands of pages of documents, and
lengthy questioning of witnesses and calling at best tangentially relevant witnesses at trial
which significantly lengthened the trial. [R. 3064-3063, %% 4-5 & n.l]
6.
Burton Lumber has allocated to the fraud claim and has deducted from the
amount of attorneys' fees for which reimbursement is sought more than the amount of
time actually expended in pursuing the fraud claim which was dismissed by the court. [R.
3065, f 5] Moreover, almost all, if not all, of the legal services performed with respect to
the fraud claim were also relevant and necessary with respect to other issues in the case
upon which Burton Lumber was successful. For example, the fact established by Burton
Lumber that Graham's business had no value other than the value of its hard assets was
relevant to Graham's unconscionability, fraud and breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing claims, among others. As a further example, the fact established by
Burton Lumber that Graham misrepresented that he had earned net profits of $250,000
per year in his business when in fact he had not earned any profits in excess of a small
salary for himself was also relevant to these claims, as well as being relevant to Graham's
credibility, including the credibility of his explanations for taking the Hamlet Homes
check that belonged to Burton Lumber and his purported justification for the phony Jason
Current invoice of $2,148. [R. 3065-3064, ^ 3]
7.
Burton Lumber did not allocate any time to the prosecution of its improper
expense reimbursement claim that the court dismissed. The amount of time involved was
minimal. [R. 3354 at pp. 80-81] Further, almost all, if not all, of the legal services
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devoted to this issue were necessary and relevant with respect to Graham's credibility in
this case, including his credibility with respect to the matters set forth in Finding No. 6.
8.
Burton Lumber did not allocate any fees to the issues on which it was
unsuccessful on summary judgment, but on which Burton Lumber prevailed at trial and
the court has concluded such an allocation is not legally required. In any event, almost
all, if not all, of the legal services provided with respect to such issues would have been
necessary in preparing for and conducting the trial. In other words, such legal services
were not duplicated at trial and were utilized by Burton Lumber at trial. [R. 3354 at pp.
89-93]
9.
The court has found that Graham's defense of Burton Lumber's claims on
which it was successful and his prosecution of his counterclaims was in bad faith and that
such defenses and claims were without merit. Burton Lumber would not have incurred
any attorneys' fees or costs for a summary judgment motion on the claims on which
Burton Lumber ultimately prevailed if Graham had not defended and prosecuted such
frivolous claims and defenses in bad faith. [See, Findings and Conclusions generally]
10.
Although the court does not believe that any further reduction of fees is
required, the court finds based upon the evidence presented and the court's review of
Burbidge & Mitchell's billings [R. 3060-2988], the pleadings, including the summary
judgment memoranda and trial briefs [R. 1359, 2352, 2689 & 2810] , that a further
reduction of $5,000 will more than compensate for any fees incurred by Burton Lumber
with respect to the improper expense reimbursement claim, the motion for summary
judgment with respect to claims that were not dismissed at the summary judgment stage
and the claims originally alleged by Burton Lumber, but not alleged in the Amended
Complaint.
12.
Thus, the net amount of reasonable attorney's fees that Burton Lumber is
entitled to recover is $164,461.25.
V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Graham has failed to demonstrate that the trial court findings which he attacks are
clearly erroneous. Instead, Graham has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the
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findings and then demonstrate that the findings are not supported by the clear weight of
the evidence. Graham has also failed to adequately brief the issues. Consequently, the
court should refuse to consider the issues raised by Graham in his brief.
The trial court correctly found that Burton Lumber was entitled to recover on its
complaint. The evidence demonstrated that Graham stole a $7,293 Hamlet Homes check
belonging to Burton Lumber and then lied to Burton Lumber about the check and made
up preposterous excuses to hide his theft; that Graham improperly obtained a $2,148
secret profit and usurped a Burton Lumber corporate opportunity by having a
subcontractor submit a phony invoice to Burton Lumber and, after receiving payment for
that invoice, secretly write a check out to Graham for the amount of the invoice; and that
Graham converted Burton Lumber's property having a value of $7,517.59. The trial court
properly awarded $34,000 in punitive damages based upon its finding that Graham's
conduct was fraudulent, willful and malicious. The amount of punitive damages was well
within the trial court's discretion and is amply supported by the trial court's findings and
supporting evidence. The trial court also properly awarded Burton Lumber its attorney's
fees pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Agreement between the parties and pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Graham never raised his argument that paragraph 9 only applies
to third party indemnity claims until this appeal and is barred from doing so. In any
event, paragraph 9 is not limited to third party indemnity situations. Graham makes no
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effort to demonstrate that the award of attorney's fees under 78-27-56 is clearly
erroneous. In fact, that award is clearly supported by the findings and supporting
evidence.
Graham has likewise failed to demonstrate that the trial court's findings dismissing
his counterclaim are clearly erroneous. Paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement was not
unconscionable and Graham's contention that it was unconscionable because it allowed
Burton Lumber to terminate him without cause and avoid paying him any further amounts
for the purchase of his business was rendered moot by the trial court's decision that
Graham was terminated for cause. In any event, there was no procedural or substantive
unconscionability and summary judgment on unconscionability was properly entered.
Burton Lumber terminated Graham for cause because of his dishonesty and therefore did
not breach any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In any event, Graham
was an employee at-will who could be terminated without cause at any time and he
understood and agreed to that provision. In addition, because Burton Lumber did not earn
any profits at the wall panel plant during 2001 through 2003, Graham would not have
been entitled to any share of profits even had he not been terminated.
Graham's Notice to Vacate was invalid because Burton Lumber was not a monthto-month tenant as it had assumed all of Graham's obligations under the lease and was
thus entitled to occupy the premises. Moreover, Graham agreed that Burton Lumber
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could vacate the premises within a few weeks after October 1 and Burton Lumber did so.
Indeed, Burton Lumber paid the monthly lease payment for October 2001 and Graham
never tendered the payment back to Burton Lumber. Moreover, the evidence showed that
the claimed damage to the premises occurred before Burton Lumber took over.
The trial court properly determined that Graham was not entitled to recover on the
six Hamlet jobs that he argued for the first time long after he was terminated belonged to
him. Those jobs in fact were Burton Lumber jobs. Graham improperly refers to Judge
Claudia Laycock5s January 12,2004 memorandum ruling granting Burton Lumber
summary judgment on Graham's unconscionability and fraud counterclaims. That ruling
was superceded by the Partial Summary Judgment which did not include the incorrect
undisputed facts that Judge Laycock had inadvertently included in her ruling and the trial
court correctly permitted evidence at trial on these issues.
Burton Lumber did not convert any equipment belonging to Graham. Burton
Lumber purchased all of Graham's personal property used in his business.
Graham's final salary check was credited against the amount owed to Burton
Lumber without objection by Graham. Graham was not owed any amount for his third
quarter bonus because he was terminated before the end of the third quarter and before
the bonus was payable. Graham was also not entitled to retain the leased truck because he
was terminated for cause. Graham is not entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs

24

because the trial court's rulings in favor of Burton Lumber are amply supported by the
evidence.
Finally, pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Agreement, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56
and Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Burton Lumber should be awarded
its attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal.
VI.
ARGUMENT
A.

GRAHAM HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING THAT
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT BURTON LUMBER IS
ENTITLED TO RECOVER ON ITS COMPLAINT ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS. THE FINDINGS ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
1.

Graham Has Failed to Marshal the Evidence Supporting the Trial
Court's Factual Findings and to Adequately Brief the Issues.

Both this court and the Supreme Court have repeatedly admonished that pursuant
to Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, an appellant challenging the factual
findings of the trial court must scower the record to marshal all of the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
to support the findings. See, United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mt.
Fonds, 2006 UT 35,ffif24-27, 140 P.3d 1200; State v. Park, 2005 UT 75, \ 17, 124 P.3d
235; Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, f 21, 54 P.3d 1177 "c[T]he
challenging party must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evidence and
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then explain how those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence'" Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 78, 100 P.3d 1177. In the case at bar, Graham has failed to even
make a pretext of marshaling the evidence supporting the trial court's findings. Instead,
Graham's brief creates its own virtual reality unpopulated by the trial court's Findings of
Fact or the overwhelming evidence supporting the findings.
Because Graham has failed to marshal the evidence, this court, in its discretion,
will assume that the trial court's findings are supported by the evidence and will refuse to
review the findings. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 2007 UT 42,ffi[ 17-21, 164 P.3d 384. This failure alone disposes of all of the
issues raised by Graham on appeal. In any event, as Burton Lumber will now
demonstrate, all of the trial court's findings challenged by Graham are amply supported
by the evidence.
Relatedly, Graham has also failed to adequately brief the issues by setting forth the
trial court's findings and all evidence supporting the findings, demonstrating why the
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and discussing and analyzing the
applicable law and relating it to the facts. Instead, Graham has done little more than to
selectively (and often inaccurately and misleadingly) cite evidence which he believes is
favorable to his cause and then simply conclude that the trial court erred in not adopting
his factual contentions. Because Graham has failed to adequately brief the issues, the
26

court should refuse to consider the issues raised in Graham's brief. See, e.g., Phillips v.
Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109-1110 (Utah App. 1995); State of Utah v. Sloan, 2003 UT
App. 170, 72 P.3d 138, 141-142; Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 198-199 (Utah
App. 1996).
2.

The Trial Court's Finding That Burton Lumber Is Entitled to Recover
the Net Amount Owing by Graham with Respect to the $7,293 Hamlet
Homes Check for Kelvin Grove Lots 20 and 22 is Not Clearly
Erroneous.

Graham erroneously asserts that he did not convert the $7,293 Hamlet Check
because the wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 Kelvin Grove Subdivision were produced by
AHS before Burton Lumber took over the wall panel plant. [Aplt's Br. at pp. 21-22] To
make this argument, Graham is forced to ignore the trial court's contrary findings, and the
overwhelming evidence supporting those findings. The evidence presented at trial
persuasively demonstrated that the Hamlet Homes check for $7,293.00 with respect to
these two lots belonged to Burton Lumber, but was converted by Graham, that Graham
then lied to Burton Lumber about the check and made up preposterous excuses to hide his
theft. [See, Findings 11-18; Pi's Ex. 72]4 For example, Hamlet only awarded jobs to its
various subcontractors by written Purchase Orders. [R. 3343 at pp. 29, 304-305 & 335]
Hamlet did not even deliver its Purchase Orders for Lots 20 and 22 until April 16, almost

4

The references to "Findings" herein refer to the findings contained in the
Statement of Facts above, which include the supporting record citations.
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a month after Burton Lumber took over on March 19. The lumber for these jobs was not
even delivered to the wall panel plant until April 27. [Finding 15(e)]5
Contrary to Graham's later contrived story, at the August 28, 2001 termination
meeting with Burton Lumber, and after sending Burton Lumber employees on wild goose
chases based on his lies, Graham finally admitted that he had cashed the Hamlet check
and that the money belonged to Burton Lumber. Graham agreed that he would repay
Burton Lumber within three days, but failed to do so. [Finding 18]
Not only is Graham's claim with respect to the $7,293.00 check belied by the
compelling documentary evidence set forth above [Finding 15], but Burton Lumber's
witnesses testified that there were no wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 at the wall panel
plant when Burton Lumber took over.6 [R. 3343 at pp. 441-442; R. 3345 at pp. 542-543]

5

Graham was forced to belatedly concede at trial that the wall panels for Lots 20
and 22 were not delivered and erected until May 3, 2001 and that Burton Lumber paid
both the framing labor in the amount of $5,391.50 and for the crane services provided by
Out of The Woods Crane Enterprises in the amount of $140.00. Thus, by Graham's own
concession he, at the very least, embezzled the amounts Burton Lumber was owed for the
framing labor and crane services in the sum of $5,531.50. In other words, Graham clearly
stole. He could only quibble about how much he stole.
6

Graham misstates the testimony of his witness, Dave Kerlin, that Dreswick style
wall panels for the Kelvin Grove subdivision lots 20 and 22 were manufactured under his
supervision while Graham was vacationing with his family in Disneyland in March 2001.
Kerlin's vague testimony is not sufficient to defeat the trial court's findings. Moreover,
Kerlin did not testify that the wall panels were for the Kelvin Grove Subdivision. Kerlin
specifically testified that wall panels were not produced ahead of schedule [R. 3349 at p.
1080], and further admitted on cross-examination that he did not know how many
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3.

The Trial Court's Finding That Burton Lumber Is Entitled to Recover
the $2,148.00 Secret Profit Graham Received By Submitting the Phony
Jason Current Invoice is Not Clearly Erroneous.

The evidence at trial clearly established, and the trial court correctly found, that at
Graham's behest Jason Current submitted a phony $2,148.00 invoice on August 17, 2001
for a generator that he did not in fact provide to a Burton Lumber job. [Finding 25]
Graham then caused Burton Lumber to immediately pay Current the $2,148.00 the next
business day and (to avoid leaving a paper trail) had Current write a check to Graham for
that same amount. [Id.] Graham thereby usurped a Burton Lumber corporate opportunity
and received a secret profit at Burton Lumber's expense. [Id.]
As general manager of Burton Lumber's panel plant, Graham owed Burton
Lumber a fiduciary duty, as the trial court correctly found. See, Envirotech Corp. v.
Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 497 (Utah App. 1994) cert den. Graham was not entitled to
make any personal profit on Burton Lumber's jobs without full and complete disclosure
to Burton Lumber. See, e.g., United States v. Drumrn, 329 F.2d 109, 112-113 (1st Cir.
1964); Green v. H&R Block, Inc., 735 A.2d 1039, 1056-1057 (Md. App. 1999);
Wormhoudt Lumber Co. ofOttumwa, 219 N.W.2d 543, 545-547 (Iowa 1974). Burton

Dreswick homes were built in any given month, did not know which lots they were built
for, and did not keep records of the panels on which homes were sitting in the yard on any
given day. Moreover, and most importantly, Kerlin admitted on cross-examination that
Graham's counsel had given him the supposed dates and that his testimony was simply
speculation. [R. 3349 at pp. 1103-1106]
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Lumber was not even required to prove out-of-pocket loss as a result of Graham's
unlawful conduct. See, Tri-Star Technologies Co. v. Lautieri, 257 B.R. 629, 636 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 2001); Wormhoudt Lumber, 219 N.W.2d at 545-547; Green, 735 A.2d at 10561057.
In addition, the trial court correctly found that the opportunity to rent generators on
Burton Lumber jobs was a corporate opportunity of Burton Lumber's that Graham
usurped for his own benefit. [Finding 25] As General Manager of the wall panel plant,
Graham was prohibited from usurping Burton Lumber's corporate opportunity for his
own profit without full and fair disclosure to Burton Lumber. See, e.g., C&Y Corp. v.
General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah App. 1995); American Federal Group,
Ltd. v. Rothenberg, 136 F.3d 897, 906 (2nd Cir. 1998).
Graham argues that there was nothing secret about his profit because he included
the charge in Burton Lumber's bid.7 [Aplt's Br. at pp. 22-23] Graham's supervisor
Hawkes denied Graham's fabricated story that Hawkes had given Graham permission to
rent generators on Burton Lumber jobs. [R. 3343 at p. 447] The trial court found that

7

Graham also erroneously argues that because Burton Lumber supposedly did not take
Current up on his offer to repay the money, that somehow constituted a waiver of Burton
Lumber's right to recover the secret profit from Graham. Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 72 (Utah 1998). Graham
cites no evidence - and there is none - that Burton Lumber intended to relinquish its right to
recover the $2,148 from Graham, who ended up with the money. The trial court rejected
Graham's factual waiver argument.
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Graham did not request or receive permission from Burton Lumber to rent generators on
Burton Lumber jobs and that Graham's supervisor had no knowledge he was doing so.
[Finding 25]8
4.

The Trial Court's Finding That Burton Lumber Is Entitled to Recover
$7,517.59 for the Property Converted by Graham is Not Clearly
Erroneous,

Burton Lumber proved at trial, and the trial court found, that Burton Lumber
acquired all Graham's personal property used in the business and located in the premises
"[ejxcept for accounts receivable and personal assets of Graham such as his home,
furniture, cars, and clothing" and that Graham converted personal property belonging to
Burton Lumber having a fair market value of $7,517.59. [Pi's Ex. 5 and Findings 27 &
28] Graham's one-half page argument on this issue that Burton Lumber "failed to
establish entitlement to the items in question" [Aplt's Br. at p. 24] fails to marshal the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings or adequately brief the issue and is without
merit.

8

Not only that, but the amount charged by Graham was outrageous; it was enough
to buy the generator rather than rent it for a few days. Susan West testified that the rental
charge for a generator was only $30 to $25 a day and a generator would only be needed
on a job for one to five days. [R. 3345 at p. 560]
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5.

Graham Has Failed to Demonstrate That the Trial Court's Award of
Punitive Damages Is Clearly Erroneous.

Graham argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the award of punitive
damages, but fails to marshal (and, wholly ignores) the supporting evidence or to
adequately brief the issue. Thus, the court should refuse to consider this issue.
In any event, the trial court found that Graham "wilfully, maliciously and with the
intent to damage Burton Lumber or in reckless disregard of Burton Lumber's rights" stole
the $7,293 Hamlet check belonging to Burton Lumber and then made up preposterous lies
to conceal his theft; that Graham intentionally embezzled the $2,148 by having Jason
Current submit the phony invoice to Burton Lumber for a generator that Current had not
in fact supplied; and that Graham had intentionally converted property belonging to
Burton Lumber. [Findings 11-18, 25 & 27-28] The trial court further found that Graham's
testimony at trial was false and fabricated in material respects. [Findings 16 & 18] The
trial court therefore properly awarded punitive damages. The court's factual findings
concerning punitive damages are fully supported by the evidence cited above. [Findings
11-18, 25, 27-28 &41.] 9

9

Graham is also wrong in arguing that Burton Lumber's dismissed fraud claim was the
only basis for punitive damages. Burton Lumber recovered for conversion of the Hamlet check,
conversion of its personal property and breach of fiduciary duty, each of which claims allowed an
award of punitive damages. See, Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951,
959 (Utah 1993); Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, U 35, 53 P.3d 997. [See, Findings and
Conclusions, generally]
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Graham also complains about the amount of punitive damages. However, the
amount of punitive damages was well within the trial court's discretion. Hall v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 959 P.2d 109 (1998). The trial court properly considered the seven factors
listed by the Supreme Court in Hall in awarding punitive damages in the amount of
$34,000, which was only approximately two times the amount of compensatory damages
awarded by the trial court and less than Graham's annual income. This amount was fully
justified by the court's findings quoted above. [Punitive Damage Findings 13-16, p. 1718, supra] Typically, Graham simply ignores these findings and the supporting evidence.
6.

Graham Has Failed to Show That the Court's Award of Attorney's
Fees Pursuant to Contract and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 Constituted
Error.
a.

Attorney's Fees Under the Agreement.

Paragraph 9 of the Agreement executed by Burton Lumber and Graham [Pi's Ex.
5] entitled Burton Lumber to recover attorney's fees incurred as a result of a breach of the
Agreement by Graham. Although Graham now argues that this provision only relates to
third party indemnity claims [Aplt's Br. at pp. 39-40], Graham did not raise this argument
below. Graham only claimed that Burton Lumber had waived the right to recover fees
under the Agreement because Burton Lumber's counsel had mistakenly stated during
opening statement in response to a question by the trial court that the Agreement did not
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contain an attorney's fee provision.10 [R. 2903-2900] Graham is barred from seeking to
raise a new argument on appeal to avoid attorney's fees. See, Coleman v. Stevens, 2000
UT98, 17P.3dll22.
Even if Graham could raise the argument at this late date, the trial court properly
found Burton Lumber was entitled to recover fees under paragraph 9 of the Agreement,
which, among other things, provides that Burton Lumber is entitled to recover fees and
costs resulting from or arising out of any breach of the Agreement or any
misrepresentations in connection therewith. The trial court found Graham breached the
Agreement and made misrepresentations in connection therewith. [Findings 7-28]
Nothing in paragraph 9 limits an award of attorney's fees to situations involving third
party indemnity claims.
b.

Attorney's Fees Under § 78-27-56.

Beyond that, the trial court properly determined that Burton Lumber was entitled
to attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 because Graham's claims and
defenses were without merit and were asserted in bad faith. [Finding 43; R. 3324-3325,
Conclusion 3; R. 2946-2951] Although Graham states the bald conclusion that "[t]he

10

Counsel's misstatement was understandable given the fact the issue of
attorney's fees was reserved for determination after trial. Counsel also made clear during
his opening statement that Burton Lumber sought attorney's fees under § 78-27-56. [R.
3344 at p. 41]
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evidence does not support the trial court's finding that [defendant's] claims and defenses
in this action are without merit and were asserted in bad faith" [Aplt's Br. at p. 39],
Graham yet again fails to marshal the overwhelming evidence cited in the Statement of
Facts above [see, e.g., Findings 11-18, 25, 27-28, & 41] that fully supports the trial
court's finding or to make any attempt to demonstrate why the trial court's finding is
supposedly clearly erroneous.
Attorney's fees are recoverable under Section 78-27-56 "if the court determines
that the action or the defense to the action [I] was without merit and [ii] not brought or
asserted in good faith." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998); Watkiss
& Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991); Warner v. DMG Color,
Inc., 2000 UT 102 at f 21, 20 P.3d 868, 874. A claim is without merit even if it may have
some basis in law if the court finds the facts to be contrary to a party's evidence.
Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315. In this regard, Graham's false testimony in the case at bar was
itself sufficient to demonstrate his bad faith. See, Topik v. Thurver, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104
(Utah 1987); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah App. 1991).11
11

Graham also argues Burton Lumber was not entitled to recover costs because it
supposedly filed its Memorandum of Costs before Judgment was entered. Aside from the fact
that Graham has cited no support for this frivolous argument other than Rule 54(d)(2) which
states no such thing, Graham's argument is factually wrong. Judgment was entered on
November 7, 2005. [R. 2981] Burton Lumber's memorandum was filed November 14, 2005. [R.
2987] Graham also states without discussion or support that Burton Lumber was only entitled to
recover $150 in costs, but fails to marshal the ample evidence supporting the trial court's ruling
awarding these costs [R. 3320] or to demonstrate the ruling is wrong.
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Finally, Graham's argument that the amount of attorney's fees awarded by the trial
court is clearly erroneous because Burton Lumber did not present sufficiently detailed
evidence concerning the fees it incurred and did not properly allocate the fees between
claims upon which Burton Lumber was successful and claims on which it was not
successful one more time completely ignores the trial court's contrary findings and the
evidence supporting those findings.12 Therefore, the court should decline to consider this
issue. Moreover, the findings are fully supported by the evidence set forth in the
Statement of Facts above. Burton Lumber filed two affidavits of its counsel as well as
copies of all of its bills for attorney's fees. [Attorney's Fees Finding 2, p. 19, supra]
Burton Lumber's counsel also testified extensively at the evidentiary hearing on
attorney's fees. [R. 3354 at pp. 1-148] As the trial court found, Burton Lumber did in fact
properly allocate. Moreover, almost all, if not all, of the services performed by Burbidge
& Mitchell on the fraud and improper reimbursement claims upon which Burton Lumber
did not prevail were also necessary with respect to the claims on which Burton Lumber
did prevail. [Attorney's Fees Findings 6-8, pp. 20-21, supra] Burton Lumber was not
required to allocate the fees where the services were necessary both with respect to claims

12

It is interesting that Graham rails about the trial court's award of $163,434 of
attorney's fees to Burton Lumber, but at the same time tells the court that an award of
$573,343.27 in attorney's fees to Graham would be reasonable. [Aplt's. Br. at p. 45]
Burton Lumber incurred attorney's fees not only to recover from Graham but to defeat Graham's
meritless counterclaims in excess of $1.5 million.
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on which it was not entitled to recover fees and claims on which it was entitled to recover
fees. See, Keith Jorgensen 's Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App. 121, Tf 27, 26
P.3d 872, 879.13
B.

GRAHAM HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS DISMISSING HIS COUNTERCLAIM ARE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. THE FINDINGS ARE FULLY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
1.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined That the Agreement Was Not
Unconscionable.

Graham argues in passing [Aplt's Br. at pp. 33-34] that the trial court erred in
ruling on summary judgment that paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement is not unconscionable.
Graham fails to adequately brief the issue or marshal the evidence and the court should
refuse to consider the issue.
The argument is also frivolous. Burton Lumber moved for summary judgment on
Graham's eighth cause of action alleging that paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement which
allowed Burton Lumber to terminate Graham without cause was unconscionable. [R.
1071 & 1359] Graham opposed the motion, arguing only that the provision allowing

13

Graham also complains that the trial court did not permit discovery concerning
attorney's fees after completion of the first phase of the trial and before the evidentiary
hearing on attorney's fees. The discovery deadline expired long before trial. [R. 641] If
Graham wanted discovery on attorney's fees he should have conducted it before the
discovery cut-off. He was not entitled to conduct additional discovery between phases of
the trial. This was a matter well within the trial court's discretion. See, Aspenwood,
LLC v. CA.T., LLC, 2003 UT App. 28, U 15, 73 P.3d 947.
37

Burton Lumber to terminate Graham without cause and avoid paying him any further
share of Burton Lumber's profits was unconscionable and there was a fact issue as to
whether Graham had acted dishonestly entitling Burton Lumber to terminate him. [R.
2170-2168] Graham's unconscionabihty argument is rendered moot by the trial court's
finding after trial that Graham was terminated with cause based upon his dishonesty.
Moreover, the trial court ruled as an undisputed fact that as a matter of law
paragraph 7.4 was not unconscionable. [R. 2371-2370; R. 2390-2387]14 Graham has
failed to even attempt to show how that ruling was wrong. It is a fundamental principal
of contract law that parties are generally free to contract on their own terms and the courts
will not relieve a party from the effects of a bargain that the party has made. See, e.g.,
Resource Management Co. v. Westin Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1040
(Utah 1985). The standard for proving unconscionabihty is high. Unconscionabihty must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. See also, Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37,
39 (Utah App. 1988). Graham failed to meet his burden of coming forward with
sufficient evidence from which the finder of fact could find unconscionabihty by clear

14

It was proper for the trial court to determine on summary judgment that the
Agreement was not unconscionable. See, Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395,
402 (Utah 1998) (affirming summary judgment that at-will employment acknowledgment
form was not unconscionable); Equitable Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d
1187, 1190-1191 (Utah App. 1993) (summary judgment granted on unconscionabihty
claim).
38

and convincing evidence at the trial. See, Andalex v. Meyers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046-1047
(UtahApp. 1994).
Unconscionability is analyzed in terms of procedural and substantive
unconscionability. "Procedural unconscionability focuses on the manner in which the
contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties." Resource Management,
706 P.2d at 1041. Substantive unconscionability "examines the relative fairness of the
obligations assumed. Substantive unconscionability is indicated by contract terms so onesided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party. . . ." Resource Management,
706 P.2d at 1041. See also, Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 375 (Utah 1996).
The trial court found based upon undisputed evidence that the contract between
Burton Lumber and Graham was not one-sided and did not shockingly favor Burton
Lumber or Graham. The trial court found that the parties were of relatively equal
bargaining strength and that Graham was able to negotiate some of the terms of the
Agreement and that he consulted with an attorney and a CPA concerning the Agreement.
[R. 2371; R 2390-2387] The trial court further found that Graham was paid the fair
market value for his business and that it was not unconscionable that he would not receive
a share of profits (there in fact were none) after he was terminated. [Id.] Moreover, the
undisputed evidence demonstrated that during negotiations of the Agreement in which
Graham was assisted by an attorney and a CPA, the termination provision was
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specifically negotiated. Graham attempted to obtain a more favorable termination
provision but was unsuccessful. Graham told Burton Lumber that he was not concerned
about the provision allowing Burton Lumber to terminate him without cause and not to
pay him any further share of profits because if he was terminated he would go next door
and set up his own business and run Burton Lumber out of business. [Findings 20 & 21]
2.

The Trial Court's Finding That Burton Lumber Did Not Breach Any
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is Not Clearly
Erroneous.

Graham's claim that Burton Lumber breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by terminating him without cause to avoid paying him a share of (non
existent) profits that he was entitled to under the Agreement was baseless and was
properly rejected by the trial court. Graham yet again fails to marshal the evidence
supporting this finding and to demonstrate the evidence is insufficient or to adequately
brief the issue. Instead, Graham misleadingly and incorrectly focuses only on evidence
that he believes supports his position.
a.

Graham Was Properly Terminated For Cause.

The trial court correctly found that Graham was terminated for cause because of
his dishonesty. These findings are fully supported by the evidence discussed above.
[Findings 11-24]
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Graham incorrectly argues in this regard that Burton Lumber decided to terminate
Graham based upon a recommendation from International Profit Associates ("IPA") in
order to avoid paying Graham further money. However, the trial court found that Burton
Lumber's decision to terminate Graham was not based on any advice or recommendation
from IP A. That decision had already been made. [Finding 18] Again, this finding is fully
supported by the evidence cited above. Indeed, this supposed "smoking gun" IPA
memorandum [Pi's Ex. 62] upon which Graham relies did not recommend that Graham be
terminated, but only recognized that his "problems" would force him to leave Burton
Lumber. [Findings 17 & 18]
b.

Graham Was an Employee At-Will Who Could Be Terminated
At Any time Without Cause.

Even if it is assumed incorrectly for argument that Burton Lumber terminated
Graham without cause, that fiction would not assist Graham. By virtue of paragraph 7.1
of the Agreement [Pi's Ex. 5] and the Acknowledgment signed by Graham, which was
attached as Exhibit B to the Agreement, Graham specifically acknowledged that he was
an employee "at-will" and could be terminated by Burton Lumber "at any time with or
without cause or notice" and that nothing in Burton Lumber's manual "guarantees
[Graham] employment with the Company for any set period of time, in any specific
position, or at any specific rate of pay."
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Under paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement, if Burton Lumber terminated Graham with
or without cause his right to receive any further share of the panel plant profits
immediately terminated. Graham testified that he was not concerned about paragraph 7.4
and that if Burton Lumber fired him he would go next door and set up his own business
and run Burton Lumber out of business. [Finding 21]
Graham nevertheless insists that he was not an at-will employee because he gave
other consideration to Burton Lumber in addition to becoming an employee by selling
Burton Lumber his business. This argument is factually incorrect because, as
demonstrated by Scott Stuart's unrebutted expert testimony, Graham's business had no
value whatsoever other than the value of its hard assets for which Graham was paid.
[Finding 9]15

15

Beyond that, although it is true that some Utah cases have stated in dicta
that an exception to the general rule that an employee at-will can be terminated without
cause is where good consideration is given by the employee in addition to the services
rendered, Graham has not cited one case actually applying that exception. The exception
is inapplicable in the case at bar because even if it were assumed that Graham's sale of
his business to Burton Lumber constituted good additional consideration (which it did
not), Graham's agreement to sell is contained in the very same Agreement by which
Graham agreed that he was an employee at-will, that he could be terminated at any time
without cause and that upon termination he would have no further right to any
compensation. In other words, there was no additional consideration given by Graham
outside of the very Agreement by which he agreed to sell his business and to become an
at-will employee who could be terminated at any time. Graham's argument that he was
nevertheless not an at-will employee turns the Agreement on its head.
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1 1 3i does the case la \ suppoi t: Graham's position that under the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing he could only be terminated for cause Ilie Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to
loytiieiil contract into an employment for a specific term. See
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c.

Graham Suffered No Damages Because There Were No Profits.

Finally, r\ <!ti" 11 il w vie cnoneously assumed for argument that Burton Lumber
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profits, Graham, suffered no damages. The uncontradicted evidence at trial demonstrated
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statements, which showed a substantial loss for 2001, 2002 and 2003, accurately reflected
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Burton Lumber marked up lumber sold to the wall panel plant and implies that Burton
Lumber improperly allocated costs. Graham has, however, been unable to cite any
evidence that these mark-ups and allocations were improper and there is none. Nor has
Graham marshaled the substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding.
The unsupported speculation of Graham's counsel did not substitute for admissible
evidence. Graham did not even present any expert testimony. The only admissible
evidence was that Burton Lumber lost money each year and that the mark-ups and
allocations Burton Lumber made to the wall panel plant were perfectly proper. [Finding
24; R. 3345 at pp. 647-645 & 667-670; R. 3347 at pp. 1396-1391; Pi's Exs. 43, 44 & 45;
R. 3348 at pp. 1656-1657] Therefore, Graham would not have received any share of nonexistent profits even had he not been terminated.
3.

The Trial Court's Finding That Graham Is Not Entitled to Recover on
His Unlawful Detainer Claim Is Not Clearly Erroneous.

Graham argues in half a page that the trial court erred in its finding that Burton
Lumber was not liable for his unlawful detainer (lease obligation) claim. [Aplt's Br. at p.
47] Again, Graham has failed to adequately brief this issue or marshal the evidence and
the court should refuse to consider the issue.
The trial court found that Graham was not entitled to recover on his unlawful
detainer claim because his Notice to Vacate was invalid as Burton Lumber had assumed
all of Graham's obligations under the lease with the landlord, including the obligation to
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premises until expiration of lease and Burton Lumber was not therefore a month to month
tenant who could be evicted with a Notice to Vacate. [Finding 32] Moreover, the court
.. . d that alter the Notice ID Vacate was served, Graham 01 ally agreec v..... jburton

•few weeks after October 1 [Finding 33] The trial couit ak** ; Mind that Burton ! umbei
paid the monthly lease payment for the panel plant nuv )cu ^ ,
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correctly found that Graham failed to prove that he suffered any damages or the amount
of damages suffered by vii !ut- of RIP K^ Lumber remaining in the premises until October
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The Trial Court's Findings That Graham Is Not Entitled to Recover on
the Six Hamlet Jobs Graham Claimed Were for the Account of AHS
Are Not Clearly Erroneous-

Kelvin Grove Lots 20 and 22 by arguing for the first time in this case long after he was
terminated that even if he was not entitled to that check, Burton I Aimber owed him money
on six i nil in:1 ir Hamlet Inu III in \^ cu: >ii|>post:cIl) AHS plr,
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as!/,:-.:-piu in ins brief [Aplt's Br. at pp. 43-46] but fails to marshal the compelling
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evidence supporting the trial court's decision or to adequately brief the issue. Not only
did Graham never make such a contention until months after he was terminated, but
Graham himself received all but one of the Hamlet checks on these six jobs and endorsed
and/or delivered the checks to Burton Lumber. [Finding 38] Based upon extensive
testimony and documentary evidence, which is ignored by Graham, the trial court
correctly found that all of these six Hamlet jobs were Burton Lumber jobs. [Findings 3840]
In making his argument on the six Hamlet jobs, Graham improperly refers to Judge
Claudia Laycock's January 12, 2004 memorandum ruling granting Burton Lumber
summary judgment on Graham's unconscionability and fraud counterclaims [R. 2379]. In
that ruling, Judge Laycock inadvertently included in a section entitled "Undisputed Facts"
(which included more than undisputed facts, including contentions of the parties) certain
facts that were indeed disputed in connection with the summary judgment motion.
However, the actual Partial Summary Judgment, which included the final Findings of
Undisputed Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order that Judge Laycock directed be
prepared and that Judge Howard later signed after he was assigned to the case, did not
contain these disputed facts. [R. 2390] The Partial Summary Judgment was the binding
order. The signed minute entry did not constitute the final order. See, Swenson
Associates Architects P.C. v. State of Utah, 998 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994); State of Utah
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v. Leatherbw y, 2003 I ] 1 2 65 P 3<: i 1 ] 8 0 1182 1183 1\ lore< >\ er, the trial c< n i I ., • ti
motion, ruled that it would hear evidence at trial on the issues Judec !

cock had

inadvertently stated in her memorandum ruling were undisputed j R 24 88; R. 3344 at pp.
12-13] Pursuant to Rule 54(b), I Jtah Rules of CI v II Procedui. i^di^,

.;udge Laycock's

revision at any time before final judgment. See, MS Construction & Eng'g Co. v.
Clearfield State Bank, 467 P.2d 410 (Utah 1970).
^

j j j e j r l a j c o u r f s Finding That Burton I mm it c it: Did I" 'Ici Ill: C ci n * c i It \ ni •
Equipment Is Not Clearly Erroneous,

The trial court correctly found that Burton Lumber did not covert any personal
property owned hi Giahan* in.cause Hur\M>

.J::' I : ,• - •••

i- personal property

the personal property that Graham contends was converted. [Pi's Ex. 5; Finding 29]
Graham has failed to marshal the evidence supporting this finding and demonstrate it as
insul licient to suppoi t the finding oi to adequately brief the Issue, [See, Aplf s Bi at p.

6.

The Trial Court's Findings That Burton Lumber Does Not Owe
Graham His Final Salary Check or a Third Quarter Bonus Are Not
Clearly Erroneous.

salary check of $1,451.43 has been offset against the $7,293.00 owed by Graham on the
A

l

Hamlet check pursuant to Robert Burton's September 5, 2001 letter, which was not
objected to by Graham, as the trial court found. [Finding 22] Graham is not entitled to
any third quarter bonus under paragraphs 7.2 and 7.4 of the Agreement because, as the
trial court properly ruled, Graham was terminated before the bonus would have accrued.
[Finding 23]
Graham has not marshaled the evidence supporting these findings or demonstrated
they are insufficient or adequately briefed these issues.
7.

The Trial Court's Finding That Graham Was Not Entitled to the
Leased Truck is Not Clearly Erroneous,

Graham's three line argument that he was entitled to the truck [Aplt's Br. at p. 44]
is without merit because the trial court correctly found, under paragraph 7.2 of the
Agreement, that Graham was only entitled to keep the truck if he was "fired without just
cause." Burton Lumber fired Graham with cause. [Findings 11-19] In fact, the evidence
established that at the August 28, 2001 meeting during which Graham's employment was
terminated, he agreed to return the truck to Burton Lumber the next day. [Finding 18]
8.

Graham Is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs.

Because the trial court's rulings in favor of Burton Lumber are supported by the
evidence and Burton Lumber did not breach the Agreement, there is no basis for
Graham's request for attorney's fees and costs. [Aplt's Br. at pp. 47-49]
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ON APPEAL,
Burton Lumber should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal
under paragraph 9 of the Agreement [Pi's Ex. 5] Meadowbrook, L.L.C, v. Flower, 959

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.as Graham's appeal is frivolous.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the ti ial c> : ui I s
judgment should be affirmc-* n ...! • -vets and that Burton Lumber should be awarded
its fees and costs incurred - n app* ul
DATED this the ^ ' c f a y of October, 2007.
R "KBin

Richard D. Burbidge ~
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee Burton
Lumber & Hardu ;ire Company

A

<)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the date below written, the undersigned hereby certifies that two true and
correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF was mailed with all postage prepaid to:
David G. Harlow
1855 North Oak Lane
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
DATED this the j p ^ d a y of October, 2007.
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FOl «< HI JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
U i Ai 1 U >l JN'I Y. S S A I'll OF UTAH
BURTON LUMBER 6c HARDWARE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

-(Propoacd)*
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

MICHAEL GRAHAM,

Civil No. 010404278
Judge Fred D Howard

vs.

Defendant.

This case came on for an eight-day bench trial before the Honorable Fred D.
Howard, Fourth District Court Judge, beginning on November 15, 2004 and ending on
April 20, 2005. Plaintiff Burton Lumber & Hardware Company ("Burton Lumber") was
represented by Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell. Defendant Michael Graham
("Graham") was represented by his attorney, David G. Harlow. The court having taken
the matter under advi:,v.nicir. and ii.ivm^ issued its wntien killing on ilK- inauu mill being
liillv advised in (lie prcrnisi •,, hereby eiilers liir follow ing hndings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
Burton Lumber's Purchase of the Wall Panel Plant
1. Graham owned and operated as a sole proprietorship a wall panel business in
Provo, Utah that he started in 1995. Graham did business under the name of Advanced
Home Systems ("AHS").
2. AHS manufactured wall panels for residential housing at AHS's plant. The
wall panels would then be installed at the job site by subcontractors.
3. Burton Lumber acquired Graham's wall panel business pursuant to an
Agreement (the "Agreement") effective February 28, 2001. [Pi's Ex. 5] The
Agreement closed on March 19, 2001, at which time Burton Lumber took over
ownership and operations and Graham became General Manager of the wall panel
plant. Under the express terms of the Agreement, Graham was an employee-at-will
and could be terminated without cause at any time. Graham also signed a separate
acknowledgment so stating. [Ex B to Pi's Ex. 5]
4. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Burton Lumber agreed to pay
Graham $54,175.00 for the fixed assets of the business. Burton Lumber also paid
Graham approximately $4,400.00 for his inventory. Burton Lumber also agreed to pay
Graham a $120,000.00 salary (which included a guaranteed $15,000 quarterly bonus)
and fifty percent of any future net profits earned by Burton Lumber in the wall panel
business during 2001, 2002 and 2003 up to a maximum purchase price of $500,000.00.
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5. Graham actively negotiated the provisions of the Agreement with Burton
Lumber. For example, Graham refused to agree to a non-competition provision unless
he was paid substantial additional compensation for an agreement not to compete.
Burton Lumber refused to pay additional compensation and a non-competition provision
was deleted from the final Agreement.
6. In negotiating the Agreement, Graham was advised both by an attorney and a
CPA.
Graham's Misrepresentations re. Profits
7. During negotiations of the Agreement, Graham represented to Burton
Lumber that he had earned $250,000 a year net profits from AHS. Graham represented
in substance that with his expertise and contacts and Burton Lumber's financial
strength, Burton Lumber could earn substantially more profits than AHS had earned.
Based upon these representations, Burton Lumber agreed to pay Graham the salary and
share of net profits described above.
8. During negotiation of the Agreement, Burton Lumber requested that Graham
provide financial statements to substantiate the profits he had earned operating AHS.
Graham said he would do so, but then told Burton Lumber that his accountant was
behind and financial statements were not yet prepared. Graham did not provide Burton
Lumber with any financial statements or other financial documentation to substantiate
his representations as to the profitability of AHS.
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9. The only documents that Graham has that would substantiate the profits AHS
had earned are his tax returns. Nevertheless, Graham refused for many months after
Burton Lumber requested production of the tax returns in this case to produce any of
his tax returns. Graham only produced his tax returns after Judge Claudia Lay cock
granted Burton Lumber's motion to compel, ordered Graham to produce them and
awarded sanctions against him for his refusal to produce the tax returns. Graham's tax
returns reflect that he never earned any profits from AHS over and above a meager
salary for his labor. His income from AHS ranged from a high of $33,582.00 in 1995
to a low of $7,384.00 in 1998. For 2000, his income was $27,434.00. [Pi's Exs. 47
thru 52] The court finds in accordance with the testimony of Burton Lumber's expert,
Scott Stuart, whose testimony the courtfindspersuasive, that Graham's wall panel plant
business was unprofitable for the six years prior to Burton Lumber's purchase of the
business and that the business had no value other than the value of its fixed assets at the
time Burton Lumber purchased the business.
10. Graham's misrepresentations regarding the profitability of his business were
material and were relied upon by Burton Lumber in purchasing Graham's business.
However, given all the circumstances, including Burton Lumber's resources, business
experience, sophistication and opportunity, its reliance upon such misrepresentations
was not reasonable. Instead of waiting for the requested verification of Graham's
represented profits, Burton Lumber completed the transaction relying upon Graham's
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representations and its own limited research into the profitability of the wall panel
business. Burton Lumber made no farther attempts to verify the profitability of the
business until after the lawsuit was commenced. Burton Lumber had every opportunity
to discover Graham's fraud by reviewing Graham's financial records.
Graham's Theft of the Hamlet Check
11. Hamlet Homes ("Hamlet") was one of the Burton Lumber wall panel plant's
largest customers. After Burton Lumber acquired AHS, Hamlet continued to send
Purchase Orders for wall panels to AHS and to make its checks for payment of the wall
panels to AHS. Graham would then pick up the checks from Hamlet's office and
endorse them over to Burton Lumber.
12. As of late July 2001, Burton Lumber's records reflected that Hamlet had
failed to make payment on two Burton Lumber invoices, Nos. 2800092 and 2800093,
for wall panels supplied for lots 20 and 22, Kelvin Grove Subdivision in Springville.
Burton Lumber contacted Hamlet concerning these invoices. Hamlet informed Burton
Lumber that it had in fact paid the invoices. Hamlet provided Burton Lumber with the
front and back of the check by which payment had been made. [Pi's Ex. 25] The
payment in the amount of $7,293.00 was paid to AHS on May 15, 2001. Graham
picked up the check at Hamlet's office on that date and cashed it at his bank on June 1,
2001.
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13. When Burton Lumber's President, Dan Burton, first discussed the Hamlet
check with Graham, he stated he did not know what happened with the check and was
researching the check. Graham then told Klay Clawson, a Burton Lumber employee,
that Graham may have left the check in his pocket and his wife had mistakenly cashed
the check. In her deposition, Graham's wife denied that she had ever found any checks
in Graham's clothes and cashed them.
14. After investigation, Burton Lumber determined that Graham himself had
endorsed the Hamlet check and cashed it at Wells Fargo Bank on University Avenue in
Provo. He had then taken $2,000.00 of the cash and immediately deposited it into his
wife's account. The balance was deposited into Graham's account. Graham was
ultimately forced to admit that he cashed the check and deposited the proceeds in his
account and his wife's account.
15. Graham has contended for the first time after this case was filed that the
work on Lots 20 and 22 was done before Burton Lumber took over the wall panel plant
and that he was entitled to keep the check. However, the $7,293.00 Hamlet check for
wall panels supplied for Kelvin Grove lots 20 and 22 clearly belonged to Burton
Lumber as demonstrated by the time line contained in Plaintiff's Ex. 72:
(a) Burton Lumber took over the operation of the wall panel plant on March
19, 2001. [See, e ^ , Pi's Exs. 7, 8, 9 & 10] At that time, all AHS business was to
immediately cease and all business was to be conducted by Burton Lumber. [Pi's Ex. 5,
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an ongoing basis and never took the position that lots 20 and 22 were AHS jobs even
though he did have the log revised to delete two jobs that were not Burton Lumber
jobs. [Pi's Exs. 21 & 22]
(h) Klay Clawson ("Clawson") prepared Burton Lumber's invoices to
Hamlet for lots 20 and 22. [Pi's Ex. 19, Bates No. B04389; Pi's Ex. 29, Bates No.
B04401] He received the information to prepare the invoices from Graham who did
not tell Clawson that on May 1, 2001 Graham had signed the Hamlet Purchase Orders
and submitted them to Hamlet to obtain payment for lots 20 and 22 or that Graham was
paid $7,293.00 for these jobs on May 15, 2001, and embezzled the money.
16. The court finds Graham's testimony with respect to the Hamlet check (and
in other areas) to be unreliable and lacking in veracity and credibility. Instead of
telling Dan Burton and others at Burton Lumber that he cashed the check when he
clearly knew he had done so and knew the check belonged to Burton Lumber, Graham
made up false excuses and sent Burton Lumber on a wild goose chase to track down the
check. Graham's testimony that he worked on wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 before
receiving any purchase orders is implausible and inconsistent with the other evidence
and is rejected by the court. Graham's excuse that he did not remember cashing the
check is disingenuous.

8

H A H 4

Graham's Termination
17. After learning of Graham's dishonesty, Dan Burton decided to terminate him
but did not want to do so immediately to avoid any adverse effect on a customer's job
in progress in Nauvoo, Illinois.
18. On August 28, 2001, Dan Burton and Jeff Burton, President and Vice
President of Burton Lumber, respectively, met with Graham at Burton Lumber's offices
in Salt Lake City. At that meeting, after first contending that he thought the money
belonged to him for a job done on Lot 70, Graham admitted cashing the Hamlet check,
that the money belonged to Burton Lumber and that he owed Burton Lumber $7,293.00
for that check. Graham stated that he would repay Burton Lumber that amount on
August 31, 2001, three days after the meeting. Graham also agreed to turn in the next
day the company truck he was using. Burton Lumber terminated Graham at the
meeting effective immediately. [See Pi's Ex. 39] Burton Lumber acted in good faith in
terminating Graham based on its good faith and reasonable belief - - consistent with the
court's finding - - that Graham had embezzled the Hamlet check. Graham's
explanations to Burton Lumber concerning the check were inadequate and incredulous.
Following termination, Graham fabricated the story that the check rightfully belonged
to him for his work on Lots 20 and 22. Burton Lumber did not terminate Graham to
avoid paying him a share of the wall panel plant profits (of which there were none).
Although Graham was an employee-at-will and could be terminated at any time without
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cause, Burton Lumber had just cause for terminating him for dishonesty. Burton
Lumber's decision to terminate Graham was not based on any advice or
recommendation from International Profit Associates. Graham did not repay the
$7,293.00 or turn in the company truck as promised. Burton Lumber was later able to
repossess that truck.
19. Under the Agreement, Graham was entitled to keep the truck Burton
Lumber leased for him and to receive title to the truck if he was terminated "without
just cause." Because Burton Lumber terminated Graham with just cause, Graham had
no right to the truck after he was terminated.
20. Under paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement, if Burton Lumber terminated
Graham with or without cause his right to receive any further share of the panel plant
profits immediately terminated. A provision more favorable to Graham had been
included in the earlier drafts of the Agreement, but was changed when the noncompetition provision was deleted. Graham unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a
$100,000 payment from Burton Lumber if he were terminated for cause.
21. Graham was not concerned with the termination provision contained in
paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement because if he were terminated he intended to
immediately go into business for himself next door and "run them [Burton Lumber] out
of business."
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22. On September 5, 2001, shortly after Graham was terminated, Burton
Lumber's General Counsel, Robert Burton sent Graham a letter stating that Burton
Lumber proposed to apply Graham's final salary check in the amount of $1,451.43
toward the $7,293.00 owed by Graham to Burton Lumber on the Hamlet check and that
if Graham disagreed with Burton Lumber doing so to notify Mr. Burton. [Pi's Ex. 40]
Graham did not object and thereby acquiesced in Burton Lumber crediting his salary
check to his debt. Graham is entitled to a credit for the amount of the final salary
check against the $7,193.00 owed on the Hamlet check. Thus, the net principal amount
owed by Graham on the Hamlet check is $5,841.57.
23. Graham was not entitled to a third quarter 2001 bonus. That bonus would
have only accrued at the September 30 end of the third quarter and was not payable
until October. [Plaintiff's Ex. 5, ^7.2] Graham had already been terminated before that
date. Under paragraph 7.2 of the Agreement, Graham had to still be employed by
Burton Lumber at the time a bonus was due to receive a bonus. Further, under
paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement, if Burton Lumber terminated Graham with or without
cause, his right to receive any bonus terminated.
24. Even if Graham had not been terminated, Burton Lumber's wall panel plant
did not earn any profits in which Graham could have shared. Burton Lumber's wall
panel plant lost $50,645.86 in 2001, $49,390.90 in 2002 and $227,570.87 in 2003.
[Pi's Exs. 43, 44 & 45]
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The Phony Jason Current Invoice for $2,148.00
25. After Graham was terminated, Burton Lumber learned of another dishonest
act that Graham had committed. Unbeknownst to Graham's superiors at Burton
Lumber, Graham had purchased a generator to personally rent to contractors on Burton
Lumber jobs where there was no temporary power. Graham caused Burton Lumber to
include a rental charge for the generator in its bid on the "Bowen job" and collect for
the generator. Graham then approached Jason Current ("Current"), a subcontractor
who installed wall panels for Burton Lumber, and had him phony up on a rush basis an
invoice to Burton Lumber for $2,148.00 for work on the Bowen job that Current
admitted he was not involved in and for work that Current did not in fact perform. [PFs
Exs. 26 & 42] Graham caused Burton Lumber to issue a check to Current for
$2,148.00 the next business day. [Pi's Exs. 27 & 42] Graham gave the check to
Current and instructed Current to simultaneously give Graham a check for the
$2,148.00, which Current did. [Pi's Exs. 28 & 42] Although Graham has attempted to
contend that he and Current were partners, Current was not a partner of Graham's in
renting generators and never agreed to any such relationship. Graham received the
entire $2,148.00, did not pay Current any portion of the profit and did not use the
money to purchase any other generator in which Current would have an interest.
Graham did not request or receive permission from Burton Lumber to rent generators
on Burton Lumber jobs and Graham's superiors at Burton Lumber had no knowledge
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he was doing so. By this subterfuge, Graham received a secret profit of $2,148.00 on a
Burton Lumber job and usurped a corporate opportunity of Burton Lumber.
The Alleged Improperly Claimed Business Expenses.
26. After learning about the stolen Hamlet check, Dan Burton investigated other
areas to determine if Graham had stolen other money from Burton Lumber. As a result
of the investigation, Burton Lumber determined that Graham had been paid for expense
reimbursements that did not appear to be proper business expenses. However, the
evidence demonstrates that Graham timely and properly submitted these expenses to
Burton Lumber following regular procedures of submission and review and that Burton
Lumber approved the expenses. If Burton Lumber had concerns whether these
expenses were legitimate, it should have conducted an investigation before approving
the expenses. Burton Lumber waived any complaint as to the legitimacy of these
claimed business expenses and there was insufficient evidence to establish that Graham
improperly claimed business expenses for which Burton Lumber should be reimbursed.
Graham's Conversion of Burton Lumber's Personal Property,
27. Under the Agreement, Burton Lumber acquired all of the assets of the wall
panel business except accounts receivable and personal assets of Graham such as his
"home, furniture, cars, and clothing." Graham was supposed to make a list of all of
the assets. [Plaintiffs Ex. 5, 111.1 and 1.6] Rather than making a list of all of the
assets, Graham listed what he informed Burton Lumber were the main assets of the
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business for which he was paid by Burton Lumber and informed Steve Hawkes that all
other business assets were included. [See Asset Schedule attached as an exhibit to
Plaintiffs Ex. 5] Graham set the total value of these assets at $54,175 and Burton
Lumber agreed to and did pay that value as fair value of all of the fixed assets. The
court finds the testimony of Dan Burton and Steven Hawkes in this regard persuasive.
28. After Graham was terminated, he took possession of and converted the
following items belonging to Burton Lumber outlined in Burton Lumber's Ex. 63:
ITEM

AMOUNT

Truck Lease Expense
Music CDs
Computer Software
Printer and Cable
Personal Truck Accessories
Notebook Case
Two (2) Skill Saws
Two (2) Miter Saws
Merrick Machine Co. Hardware
Convertor for Lap Top
Palm Digital Camera
Medium Digital Camera
Saw Blades
Forklift Extensions
10" Makita Compound Slide Saw
Green Horizontal Boring Machine
123" Delta Power Plane
Two (2) Duo-Fast Nail Guns

$1,123.57
26.48
297.47
345.50
177.20
59.99
318.00
85.92
518.10
85.27
499.99
19.99
753.31
800.00
499.00
1,049.00
409.00
450.00

These items belonged to Burton Lumber under the Agreement. Consequently, Graham
unlawfully converted these items and Burton Lumber is entitled to recover their value
in the amount of $7,517.59.
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Burton Lumber's Alleged Conversion of Graham's Personal Property,
29. Burton Lumber did not convert any personal property owned by Graham.
Burton Lumber owned all of the personal property that Graham left at the wall panel
plant premises when he was terminated, including the personal property listed in
Plaintiff's Ex. 29 that Graham contends was converted. In this regard, Dan Burton and
Steve Hawkes conceded that Graham's Gooseneck trailer and van were not part of the
sale and Graham was entitled to those items.
The Notice to Vacate
30. Under the terms of the Agreement, Burton Lumber agreed to assume all of
Graham's ongoing obligations under his lease with the landlord for the panel plant.
Although Burton Lumber decided not to have the lease assigned to it, Burton Lumber
did in fact assume and pay Graham's ongoing obligations under the lease, including the
monthly lease payments.
31. On September 7, 2001 (ten days after he was terminated), Graham served a
Notice to Vacate on Burton Lumber, giving Burton Lumber notice of his demand that
Burton Lumber vacate the panel plant premises no later than October 1, 2001.
32. The Notice to Vacate was invalid because Burton Lumber had assumed all
of Graham's obligations under the lease with the landlord, including the obligation to
pay rent until expiration of the lease and had the corresponding right to occupy the
premises until expiration of the Lease. Thus, Burton Lumber was not a month-to-

15

month tenant. Nevertheless, Burton Lumber wanted a bigger plant with a better
location anyway and, after receiving the Notice to Vacate, decided to vacate the panel
plant as soon as it could locate alternative space to operate the business.
33. Klay Clawson, who was then the manager of the wall panel plant, told
Graham that Burton Lumber would not be able to vacate for a few weeks after October
1. Graham told Clawson that was okay and thereby agreed that Burton Lumber could
have a few weeks after October 1 to vacate the premises.
34. Burton Lumber subsequently found alternative space and vacated the panel
plant on October 25, 2001.
35. Burton Lumber paid the landlord the monthly lease payment on the panel
plant for October 2001 in the amount of $1,705.29. [Pi's Ex. 46] Graham never
tendered this payment back to Burton Lumber.
36. Graham failed to prove that he suffered any damages or the amount of
damages suffered by virtue of Burton Lumber remaining in the premises until October
25,2001.
The Alleged Waste to the Premises,
37. Burton Lumber did not do any damage to the panel plant. Any damage to
the panel plant had been done by AHS before Burton Lumber acquired the panel plant.
Moreover, at the time Graham claims damage was done to the panel plant, he was the
General Manager of the plant and responsible for its care and maintenance. He had the
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duty as General Manager to ensure that the plant premises were properly maintained.
There was no evidence that Graham reported any damage to his superiors at Burton
Lumber or caused his employees to repair damages he now claims they did under his
supervision.
The Six Other Hamlet Jobs Graham Claims Were for the Account of AHS.
38. Graham contended for the first time long after this lawsuit was filed that
Burton Lumber owed him money on six Hamlet jobs in addition to Lots 20 and 22 that
Graham claims were AHS jobs. These jobs are the following: Muirfield Lot 443, Glen
Eagles Lots 109 and 114, and Shetland Meadows Lots 36, 70 and 82. Graham himself
received all but one of the Hamlet checks on these jobs and endorsed and/or delivered the
checks to Burton Lumber. Graham never contended that these jobs were AHS jobs until
months after he was terminated. The court concludes that each of these jobs was in fact a
Burton Lumber job and that Graham is not entitled to recover any sums relating to these
jobs.
39. Each of the six jobs was included as a Burton Lumber job on the Burton
Lumber work order log that was maintained under Graham's supervision and direction
and that he reviewed on an ongoing basis. Graham never deleted these jobs even though
he changed the log to delete two other jobs that did not belong to Burton Lumber. [See
Plaintiffs Ex. 21, BateNos. 01080 and 01079]
40. Plaintiffs Ex. 73, which is a time line summarizing the relevant dates with
respect to these jobs, plainly demonstrates that these lots were Burton Lumber jobs:
17

Muirfield Lot 443
Burton Lumber acquired AHS and Graham started working for Burton Lumber
on March 19, 2001. The wall panels were delivered to the job site by Out of the
Woods Crane Enterprises and erected on site on March 28 and 29. Hamlet paid AHS
for the wall panels on this lot on April 16. Graham endorsed the check over to Burton
Lumber, thereby evidencing his knowledge that the payment for this lot belonged to
Burton Lumber.
Glen Eagles Lot 109
The site construction did not start on this house until March 27, 2001, eight days
after Burton Lumber acquired AHS and Graham went to work for Burton Lumber.
Anderson Lumber did not deliver the materials to Burton Lumber for this job until
March 29. Graham signed a Hamlet Purchase Order to obtain payment on this job on
April 6. The wall panels were delivered to the job site by the crane company and
erected on site on April 7. Hamlet paid AHS on April 30 and Graham again endorsed
the check to Burton Lumber, acknowledging that the job belonged to Burton Lumber.
Glen Eagles Lot 114
The site construction on this house started on March 27, 2001, eight days after
Burton Lumber acquired AHS and Graham went to work for Burton Lumber. Hamlet
delivered its Purchase Order for this job on March 29. Anderson Lumber delivered the
materials for this job on March 29. The wall panels were delivered to the job site by
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the crane company and erected on site on April 5. Graham signed the Hamlet Purchase
Order to obtain payment on April 6. Hamlet paid AHS for this job on April 30.
Again, Graham endorsed the check to Burton Lumber, acknowledging that the job
belonged to Burton Lumber.
Shetland Meadows Lot 36
The site construction started on this house on March 27, 2001, eight days after
Burton Lumber acquired AHS and Graham went to work for Burton Lumber.
Anderson Lumber delivered the materials to Burton Lumber for this job on March 29.
Burton Lumber invoiced Hamlet for the job on April 27. Graham approved all
invoices. Graham picked up the Hamlet check for Burton Lumber on May 15, at the
same time that he picked up the check for Kelvin Grove Lots 20 and 22. Graham
endorsed and delivered the check for Lot 36 to Burton Lumber, again recognizing the
job belonged to Burton Lumber.
Shetland Meadows Lot 82
The site construction started on this house on March 22, 2001, three days after
Burton Lumber acquired AHS and Graham went to work for Burton Lumber.
Anderson Lumber delivered the materials to Burton Lumber for this job on March 29.
Burton Lumber invoiced Hamlet on April 27. Graham approved all invoices. Graham
picked up the check for this job from Hamlet on May 15, at the same time that he
picked up the check for Kelvin Grove Lots 20 and 22. By endorsing and delivering the
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Hamlet check for Lot 82 to Burton Lumber, Graham again acknowledged that the job
belonged to Burton Lumber.
Shetland Meadows Lot 70
The buyer selections for this lot that would have to be made before walls could
be constructed were made on March 22, 2001, three days after Burton Lumber
acquired AHS and Graham went to work for Burton Lumber. The site construction of
the house started on April 17, 2001, almost a month after the acquisition. Anderson
Lumber delivered to the job site the materials to Burton Lumber for this job on April
25. The wall panels were delivered by the crane company and erected on site on April
30 and May 2, six weeks after Burton Lumber acquired AHS. Burton Lumber invoiced
Hamlet on September 10. Hamlet paid Burton Lumber on September 28. This lot was
clearly a Burton Lumber job.
Punitive Damages
41. The court finds that in embezzling the Hamlet check, obtaining the secret
profit from the rental of his generator and converting Burton Lumber's personal
property, Graham acted fraudulently, willfully, maliciously and with the intent to
damage Burton Lumber or in reckless disregard of Burton Lumber's rights. Therefore,
punitive damages should be awarded against Graham in an amount to be determined by
the court at a future hearing.
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Attorney's Fees
42. Paragraph 9 of the Agreement contains the following attorney's fee
provision:
Indemnity. All of the representations, warranties, and covenants in
this Agreement and the obligations of the parties with respect thereto shall
survive the Closing. Seller agrees that he will indemnify, defend, protect
and hold harmless Buyer and its employees from and against all liabilities,
claims, damages, actions, demands, assessments, adjustments, penalties,
losses, costs and expenses whatsoever (including court costs and
attorneys' fees) that arise as a result of or incident to the following:
Occurrences before the Closing Date; any breach of, misrepresentation in,
untruth in or inaccuracy in the representations and warranties by Seller;
non-fulfillment or non-performance of any agreement, covenant or
condition on the part of Seller made in this Agreement or an [sic] any
other document delivered pursuant to this Agreement.
43. With the exception of Graham's defense to Burton Lumber's
misrepresentation of profits and reimbursement of personal expense claims, Graham's
claims and defenses in this action are without merit and were asserted in bad faith.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court hereby enters the following
conclusions of law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
To the extent that any of the foregoing findings of fact constitute conclusions of
law, the court incorporates such findings into these conclusions. Similarly, to the
extent that the following conclusions also constitute findings of fact, the court
incorporates such conclusions into the court's findings.
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1. Graham embezzled the $7,293.00 Hamlet check and converted that check on
May 15, 2001, thus breaching his Agreement with Burton Lumber. Burton Lumber is
therefore entitled to recover from Graham the sum of $7,293.00, less an offset of
$1,451.43 which is the amount of Graham's final salary check, or a net recovery of
$5,841.57, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal rate from May 15, 2001.
2. Graham obtained a secret profit and usurped Burton Lumber's corporate
opportunity in the amount of $2,148.00 in breach of his Agreement with Burton
Lumber through the subterfuge of submitting a phony invoice to Burton Lumber from
one of its subcontractors, Jason Current, and then having Mr. Current pay that money
to Graham. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover the amount of this secret profit of
$2,148.00, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal rate from August 20, 2001.
3. Graham converted the personal property belonging to Burton Lumber
described in Finding No. 28 above that Graham had agreed to sell to Burton Lumber,
thereby breaching his Agreement with Burton Lumber. Burton Lumber is therefore
entitled to recover the value of the personal property in the amount of $7,517.59, plus
pre-judgment interest at the legal rate from August 28, 2001.
4. Graham breached his fiduciary duty to Burton Lumber and was unjustly
enriched by virtue of the conduct described in conclusions 1 through 3.
5. There is insufficient evidence to establish that Graham received improper
reimbursement of personal expenses and Burton Lumber has waived any such claim.
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6. Although Graham materially misrepresented to Burton Lumber that he had
earned $250,000 a year net profits in his wall panel business and Burton Lumber relied
upon that representation in purchasing Graham's business, Burton Lumber did not
reasonably rely on the misrepresentation and is therefore not entitled to recover for
fraud.
7. Burton Lumber had just cause for terminating Graham because of his
dishonesty in embezzling the $7,293.00 Hamlet check. Even if, contrary to this court's
finding, Graham did not embezzle the check, Burton Lumber terminated Graham based
upon the reasonable good faith belief that he had embezzled the check. Burton Lumber
did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or breach the
Agreement between the parties.
8. In any event, Graham did not lose any share of profits as a result of his
termination by Burton Lumber because Burton Lumber's wall panel plant business did
not earn any profits during 2001, 2002 or 2003, but instead lost money each year.
9. Burton Lumber did not convert the truck it leased for Graham. Because
Graham was terminated for just cause, Graham had no right to the truck after he was
terminated by Burton Lumber.
10. Burton Lumber did not convert any of Graham's personal property or
commit trespass thereto. All of the personal property that Graham alleges was
converted belonged to Burton Lumber under the Agreement as Burton Lumber
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purchased all of the assets utilized in the wall panel plant business other than accounts
receivable and Graham's personal assets such as his "home, furniture, cars, and
clothing."
11. Muirfield Lot 443, Glen Eagles Lots 109 and 114 and Shetland Meadows
Lots 36, 70 and 82 were Burton Lumber jobs and Graham is not entitled to any
recovery or offset with respect to these jobs.
12. There is no basis for imposition of a constructive trust in Graham's favor as
Burton Lumber had just cause for terminating Graham, there were no profits earned by
the wall panel plant in the period 2001-2003 that Graham would have been entitled to
share in had he not been terminated, Burton Lumber was not unjustly enriched, there is
no res to which a constructive trust could attach and Graham's remedies, if any, would
be based on the Agreement.
13. Burton Lumber was not guilty of unlawful detainer because it was not a
month-to-month tenant and the notice to vacate was invalid and because Graham orally
agreed that Burton Lumber could have a few weeks after October 1, 2001 in which to
vacate the premises. In any event, Graham has failed to prove any damages arising
from the fact that Burton Lumber did not vacate the premises until October 25, 2001.
14. Burton Lumber did not trespass on the premises as Burton Lumber was in
lawful occupancy thereof until it vacated on October 25, 2001.
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15. Graham is not entitled to recover on his Counterclaim for waste because any
damage to the panel plant was done prior to the time that Burton Lumber acquired
Graham's business and even if damage had been done to the panel plant after that time,
Graham had the responsibility for supervising and maintaining the panel plant.
16. Punitive damages should be awarded against Graham in an amount to be
determined after further hearing.
17. Graham breached the Agreement to sell Burton Lumber all of the assets of
his business other than accounts receivable and personal assets by taking and converting
the assets described in paragraph 28 above. Graham further breached the Agreement
under which all business done after March 19, 2001 was agreed to be for the benefit of
Burton Lumber by taking, converting and embezzling the $7,293.00 Hamlet check.
Graham further breached the employment provisions of paragraph 7 of the Agreement,
including paragraph 7.3 which obligated him to work full time for Burton Lumber and
not to "work in other business pursuits" by renting generators on Burton Lumber jobs
without Burton Lumber's knowledge or consent and obtaining the $2,148.00 secret
profit as described in paragraph 25 above. Consequently, Burton Lumber is entitled to
recover its attorney's fees in prosecuting these claims in an amount to be determined
after further hearing. Further, Graham's defense of all of Burton Lumber's claims,
except the misrepresentation of profits and expense reimbursement claims, and the
counterclaims asserted by Graham against Burton Lumber were without merit and not
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brought or asserted in good faith. Thus, Burton Lumber is entitled to recover
attorney's fees with respect to all claims except the misrepresentation of profits and the
expense reimbursement claims pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.
18. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover its taxable costs incurred herein from
Graham.
DATED this 7 ^ day of

A/J/jihnfi/y^
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, 2005.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following on
the ^?g> day of
<C)to*tJL^
, 2005:
David G. Harlow, Esq.
1855 North Oak Lane
Provo, Utah 84604

(///U^
P \JGlines\Chents\BURTON LUMBERVFINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS wpd
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ADDENDUM B
PLAINTIFF BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE COMPANY'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES DATED AUGUST 17,

2006

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)355-6677

-l/pfa

m

Deputy

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

PLAINTIFF BURTON LUMBER &
HARDWARE COMPANY'S
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE.
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

MICHAEL GRAHAM,
Defendant.

Civil No. 010404278
Judge Fred D. Howard

The hearing on the amount of attorneys' fees and punitive damages to be awarded
to Plaintiff Burton Lumber & Hardware Company ("Burton Lumber") in this action was held
on June 29, 2006 before the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth District Court Judge.
Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell appeared on behalf of Burton Lumber.
David G. Harlow appeared on behalf of Defendant Michael Graham ("Graham"). The
court having heard and considered the evidence presented by the parties and the
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Burton Lumber incurred attorneys' fees in prosecuting its claims and
defending the counterclaims asserted by Graham in this action in the amount of
$164,933.75. Burton Lumber incurred additional attorneys' fees of $6,027.50 with
respect to the hearing on the amount of attorneys' fees and punitive damages and
preparation of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental Judgement
with respect thereto. Thus, the total attorneys' fees incurred by Burton Lumber in this
action is the amount of $170,961.25. This amount is exclusive of attorneys' fees
incurred by Burton Lumber with respect to its fraud claim against Graham which was
dismissed by the court.
2. In support of its claim for attorneys' fees, Burton Lumber presented the
affidavit and testimony of its lead counsel, Richard D. Burbidge, and all of its billing
records. Burbidge & Mitchell's time records are kept by attorneys at Burbidge &
Mitchell by hand and then those time records on cases are typed up as the billing
statement. There is no additional detail in the time records kept by individual attorneys
other than what is included in the bills.
3. When this case was originally filed, Robert Burton represented Burton
Lumber and expended a substantial number of hours representing Burton Lumber in
this case with respect to which Burton Lumber is not claiming any reimbursement.
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4. The normal hourly rate charged by Richard D. Burbidge for legal services is
$350.00 per hour. The normal hourly rate of Stephen B. Mitchell charged for his legal
services is $310.00 an hour. Messrs. Burbidge and Mitchell performed the vast bulk of
the legal services performed for Burton Lumber in this action. Nevertheless, Burton
Lumber was billed and paid for their legal services at the substantially reduced rate of
$200.00 per hour based upon the relationship between Burbidge & Mitchell and Burton
Lumber. Graham obtained the benefit of this substantially reduced billing rate. The
time of associates and paralegals at Burbidge & Mitchell was billed at their normal
rates ranging from $40.00 to $165.00.
5. The legal services performed by Burbidge & Mitchell on behalf of Burton
Lumber and the legal fees incurred with respect thereto were necessary, reasonable and
appropriate. Both the hourly rates and the amount of attorneys' fees charged by
Burbidge & Mitchell to Burton Lumber in this action were reasonable and customary
according to the custom and practice in both Salt Lake County and Utah County
considering the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of Burton Lumber's counsel in
presenting the case, the expertise and experience of the attorneys representing Burton
Lumber and the result obtained, including successfully defending the counterclaims
asserted by Graham against Burton Lumber of approximately $1.5 Million. In this
regard, the amount of attorneys' fees incurred by Burton Lumber was substantially
increased as a result of Graham's litigation strategy, including the taking of numerous
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lengthy depositions, requesting and receiving many thousands of pages of documents,
and lengthy questioning of witnesses and calling at best tangentially relevant witnesses
at trial which significantly lengthened the trial.
6. Burton Lumber has allocated to the fraud claim and has deducted from the
amount of attorneys' fees for which reimbursement is sought more than the amount of
time actually expended in pursuing the fraud claim which was dismissed by the court.
Moreover, almost all, if not all, of the legal services performed with respect to the
fraud claim were also relevant and necessary with respect to other issues in the case
upon which Burton Lumber was successful. For example, the fact established by
Burton Lumber that Graham's business had no value other than the value of its hard
assets was relevant to Graham's unconscionability, fraud and breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, among others. As a further example,
the fact established by Burton Lumber that Graham misrepresented that he had earned
net profits of $250,000 per year in his business when in fact he had not earned any
profits in excess of a small salary for himself was also relevant these claims, as well as
being relevant to Graham's credibility, including the credibility of his explanations for
taking the Hamlet Homes check that belonged to Burton Lumber and his purported
justification for the phony Jason Current invoice of $2,148.
7. Burton Lumber did not allocate any time to the prosecution of its improper
expense reimbursement claim that the court dismissed. The amount of time involved
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was minimal. Further, almost all, if not all, of the legal services devoted to this issue
were necessary and relevant with respect to Graham's credibility in this case, including
his credibility with respect to the matters set forth in Finding No. 6.
8. Burton Lumber did not allocate any fees to the issues on which it was
unsuccessful on summary judgment, but on which Burton Lumber prevailed at trial and
the court has concluded such an allocation is not legally required. In any event, almost
all, if not all, of the legal services provided with respect to such issues would have been
necessary in preparing for and conducting the trial. In other words, such legal services
were not duplicated at trial and were utilized by Burton Lumber at trial.
9. The court has found that Graham's defense of Burton Lumber's claims on
which it was successful and his prosecution of his counterclaims was in bad faith and
that such defenses and claims were without merit. Burton Lumber would not have
incurred any attorneys' fees or costs for a summary judgment motion on the claims on
which Burton Lumber ultimately prevailed if Graham had not defended and prosecuted
such frivolous claims and defenses in bad faith.
10. Although the court does not believe that any further reduction of fees is
required, the court finds based upon the evidence presented and the court's review of
Burbidge & Mitchell's billings, the pleadings, including the summary judgment
memoranda and trial briefs, that a further reduction of $5,000 will more than
compensate for any fees incurred by Burton Lumber with respect to the improper
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expense reimbursement claim, the motion for summary judgment with respect to claims
that were not dismissed at the summary judgment stage and the claims originally
alleged by Burton Lumber, but not alleged in the Amended Complaint.
11. Graham is entitled to a credit against the amount of attorneys' fees incurred
by Burton Lumber in the amount of $1,500.00 for sanctions previously paid by Graham
to Burton Lumber constituting partial reimbursement of Burton Lumber's attorneys'
fees incurred in connection with motions to compel.
12. Thus, the net amount of reasonable attorneys' fees that Burton Lumber is
entitled to recover from Graham is $164,461.25.
Punitive Damages
13. Graham's current annual income is approximately $40,000. Graham's tax
returns introduced into evidence at the attorneys' fee hearing reflect that his annual
income was $60,654 in 2001; $33,065 in 2002; $61,943 in 2003 and $57,548 in 2004.
His net worth is approximately $12,000 according to Graham's testimony.
14. The nature of Graham's dishonest conduct and the facts and circumstances
surrounding that conduct as described more fully in the court's previous Findings of
Fact entered in this action are reprehensible especially given the fiduciary duties that
Graham owed to Burton Lumber as the General Manager of its wall panel plant.
Graham stole from Burton Lumber and then lied about his theft and made up
preposterous lies and excuses to attempt to conceal his dishonesty. Graham then forced
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Burton Lumber to incur very substantial attorneys' fees to defend Graham's frivolous
counterclaims, which Graham asserted in bad faith, and in order to recover the monies
owed by Graham to Burton Lumber for theft of the Hamlet Homes check, the phony
Jason Current invoice paid by Burton Lumber and Burton Lumber's personal property
stolen by Graham.
15. Not only was Burton Lumber forced to incur very substantial attorneys' fees,
but Graham's dishonesty and wrongful prosecution and defense of this lawsuit forced
Burton Lumber management and employees to spend hundreds of hours to defend
against Graham's counterclaims and support the claims asserted by Burton Lumber
against Graham. This time included preparing for and appearing at numerous lengthy
depositions taken by Graham, assembling, analyzing and producing many thousands of
pages of Burton Lumber documents and preparing for and testifying at trial.
16. The court finds there is a probability that Graham may engage in dishonest
business conduct in the future. Graham testified falsely at trial concerning his actions.
At the June 29, 2006 hearing,*Graham admitted he had "ripped off Burton Lumber
and may do it again if he sold another business. Graham has never apologized to
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Burton Lumber for his actions.
17. The actual principal amount of the damages awarded to Burton Lumber with
respect to Graham's dishonest conduct was^ $16,958.00.
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18. It is reasonable to award punitive damages against Graham in the amount of
$34,000.00, or approximately two times the actual damages awarded against Graham.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court hereby enters the following
conclusions of law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
To the extent that any of the foregoing findings of fact constitute conclusions of
law, the court incorporates such findings into these conclusions. Similarly, to the
extent that the following conclusions also constitute findings of fact, the court
incorporates such conclusions into the court's findings.
Attorneys' Fees
1. Burton Lumber should be awarded its reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in
prosecuting its Complaint and defending Graham's counterclaims in the amount of
$164,461.25. This amount does not include the fees incurred with respect to Burton
Lumber's fraud claim and the court has further reduced the fees requested by $5,000
which the court does not believe is required by the law but is being made to more than
compensate for any fees charged with respect to the improper expense reimbursement
claim, the summary judgment motion with respect to claims not dismissed on summary
judgment and claims originally alleged by Burton Lumber, but not alleged in its
Amended Complaint.
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2. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover pre-judgment interest on the attorneys'
fees awarded at the legal rate.
3. Cache County v. Beus, 2005 UT App. 204, 128 P.3d 63, cited by Graham,
does not apply in the case at bar. In that case, both parties moved for summary
judgment as to whether Cache County had breached a lease. The trial court ruled that
Cache County had not breached the Lease.1 On the first appeal ("Cache County I"),
the court of appeals reversed the summary judgment that the County had not breached
the Lease, ruling that the County had breached the Lease between the parties, but
remanded the case to the trial court on the issue of substantial compliance, stating that
material fact issues existed "concerning the adverse consequences of forfeiture suffered
by Cache County in relation to the damages suffered by" defendants because of the
County's breach. On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of the County that the
Lease remained in full force and effect, that ejectment was not a proper remedy and
that defendants were not entitled to any damages. The trial court, therefore,
determined that the County was the "substantially prevailing party" under the Lease
provisions and was entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs incurred
during the entire case. On the second appeal, the court of appeals held that the County
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The trial court determined that plaintiff Cache County prevailed on summary
judgment but awarded defendants their attorneys' fees and court costs because "it was [Cache]
County's fault that this matter was brought in the first place." The County did not appeal the
trial court's award of attorneys' fees and court costs to defendants for the summary judgment
proceedings, nor did the County seek review of the court of appeals' award of attorneys' fees
to defendants on the first appeal.
9

was entitled to recover its attorneys' fees and court costs incurred that were
"attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights," not including the fees
incurred with respect to its motion for summary judgment that the County had not
breached the Lease, which was unsuccessful, and its unsuccessful appeal in Cache
County L In short, the breach of lease issue was decided as a matter of law on
summary judgment and an appeal from that summary judgment and the County lost at
both levels. Cache County v. Beus did not involve a situation where a party was
unsuccessful on summary judgment in dismissing claims, but ultimately prevailed at
trial on those claims and does not stand for the proposition that a party who ultimately
prevails on a claim cannot recover fees incurred in seeking summary judgment on that
claim. Rather, the only issue on which the County prevailed, and with respect to which
it was thus entitled to attorneys' fees, was the issue of whether the County had
substantially complied with the Lease, which issue was considered by the trial court on
remand after the first appeal. In the case at bar, Burton Lumber is entitled to recover
attorneys' fees with respect to claims on which it was ultimately successful.
Furthermore, in Cache County v. Beus, the Lease was the only basis for an award of
attorneys' fees and the court of appeals recognized that Cache County was "entitled
only to those fees attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights." In the
case at bar, the court has determined that in addition to the contractual provision Burton
Lumber is entitled to attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 and that all of
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Burton Lumber's fees were incurred because of Graham's bad faith assertion of all of
his counterclaims and his defenses to Burton Lumber's claims except his defenses to
Burton Lumber's fraud and improper expense reimbursement claims. Therefore, for
this additional reason, the attorneys' fees incurred by Burton Lumber in connection
with its summary judgment motion are recoverable except those fees incurred with
respect to the fraud and improper expense reimbursement claims.
4. Promax Development Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254, cited by
Graham, is not applicable in the case at bar. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court
awarded the Railes their attorneys' fees in defending their judgment on appeal.
However, the Railes had moved to dismiss the appeal as not being timely filed. The
Supreme Court ruled against the Railes on that issue, determining that the appeal had in
fact been timely filed. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the Railes were not
entitled to recover fees incurred with respect to their unsuccessful motion to dismiss the
appeal because they had not prevailed on that issue. Promax was not a case where a
party unsuccessfully moved to dismiss a claim, but ultimately prevailed in dismissing
the claim at trial. In the case at bar, the court has not awarded any attorneys' fees with
respect to the issues on which Burton Lumber did not prevail. However, Burton
Lumber ultimately prevailed on all issues except Burton Lumber's fraud and improper
expense reimbursement claim.
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Punitive Damages
5. In determining the amount of punitive damages to be awarded against
Graham, the court has considered the seven factors listed by the Utah Supreme Court in
Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 959 P.2d 109 (1998): (1) Graham's relative wealth; (2)
the nature of Graham's conduct; (3) the facts and circumstances surrounding Graham's
conduct; (4) the effect thereof on Burton Lumber; (5) the probability of future
recurrence of the misconduct; (6) the relationship of the parties; and (7) the amount of
actual damages awarded.
6. Based on these factors, punitive damages should be awarded against Graham
in the amount of $34,000.00.
DATED this / / ^ d a y of August, 2006.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following on
the-J^ day of July, 2006:
David G. Harlow, Esq.
1855 North Oak Lane
Provo, Utah 84604

P \JGlines\Chents\BURTON LUMBER\FINDINGS & CONCLUSION^*! fees and damages wpd
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ADDENDUM C
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED FEBRUARY

11,2004

RLED
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-6677

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Ua;i County, State of Utah
Deputy

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

MICHAEL GRAHAM,
Defendant.

Civil No. 010404278
Judge Claudia Laycock
/°WU^KAJL

Plaintiff Burton Lumber & Hardware Company's ("Burton Lumber") motion for
partial summary judgment came on for hearing before the court, The Honorable Claudia
Laycock, Judge, on November 20, 2003. Stephen B. Mitchell of Burbidge & Mitchell
appeared on behalf of Burton Lumber. David G. Harlow appeared on behalf of
Defendant Michael Graham ("Graham"). The court, having read and considered the
papers filed in connection with the motion, having heard and considered the argument of
counsel and having issued its Ruling on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
January 12,2004 granting the motion with respect to the First Claim for Relief of

Graham's Counterclaim for unconscionability and Sixth Claim for Relief of Graham's
Counterclaim for fraud, and denying the remainder of the motion, summary judgment is
hereby entered in favor of Burton Lumber dismissing the First Claim for Relief of the
Counterclaim for unconscionability and the Sixth Claim for Relief of the Counterclaim
for fraud with prejudice.
UNDISPUTED FINDINGS OF FACTS
The court determines that the following facts with respect to the dismissed claims
are established by the evidence without dispute:
1. Graham actively negotiated the provisions of the Purchase Agreement (the
"Contract") with Burton Lumber. For example, Graham refused to agree on a noncompetition provision in the Contract without substantial additional compensation that
Burton Lumber was unwilling to pay. Accordingly, the non-competition provision was
not included in the contract.
2. Before the signing the Contract, Graham consulted with an attorney and a CPA
concerning the Contract.
3. The Contract provided for two types of payments to be made to Graham for the
purchase of his business, Advanced Home Systems ("AHS"). First, Burton Lumber
agreed to pay "an initial purchase price" that was the fair market value of the hard assets
of AHS. Burton Lumber also agreed to pay a "contingent deferred purchase Price" that
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gave Graham 50% of the net profits earned by Burton Lumber from the wall panel
business during 2001, 2002 and 2003 up to a maximum purchase price of $500,000.00.
4. Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Burton Lumber agreed to pay Graham
$54,175.00 for the fixed assets of the business.
5. Burton Lumber also agreed to pay Graham an annual salary of $120,000.00
(including bonus).
6. Paragraph 7.2 of the Contract provided that in the event Graham was terminated
for any reason he would no longer be entitled to receive the contingent deferred purchase
price payments.
7. When Burton Lumber purchased AHS, Graham became the General Manager
and signed an acknowledgment that he was an employee-at-will and could be terminated
at any time.
8. Burton Lumber terminated Graham at a meeting on August 28, 2001.
9. The Contract between Burton Lumber and Graham is not one-sided and does
not shockingly favor either Burton Lumber of Graham.
10. Burton Lumber and Graham had relatively equal bargaining strength.
11. The Contract is not unconscionable.
12. There is no evidence that Burton Lumber represented to Graham that it would
only terminate Graham's employment for cause only or that Graham relied upon any such
alleged representations to his detriment.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. As a matter of law, the Contract is not unconscionable. Therefore, the First
Claim for Relief of the First Amended Counterclaim should be dismissed.
2. Graham has failed to plead or prove fraud with particularity and there is no
evidence to support the fraud claim. Accordingly, the Sixth Claim for Relief of the First
Amended Counterclaim should be dismissed.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the First Claim
for Relief and Sixth Claim for Relief of the First Amended Counterclaim shall be, and
hereby are, dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this /&

day of

/^£^g^<^2004.
BY THE

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following on
the y 7 ^ day of January, 2004:
David G. Harlow, Esq.
1855 North Oak Lane
Provo, Utah 84604

C \jg\BURTON LUMBERVPARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT wpd
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ADDENDUM D
JUDGMENT DATED NOVEMBER 7,2005

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)355-6677

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

WW*

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE
COMPANY,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL GRAHAM,

Civil No. 010404278
Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendant.

This case came on for an eight-day bench trial before the Honorable Fred D.
Howard, Fourth District Court Judge, beginning on November 15, 2004 and ending on
April 20, 2005. The court having taken the matter under advisement, having previously
entered its Ruling and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judgment is hereby
entered in favor of Plaintiff Burton Lumber & Hardware Company and against Defendant
Michael Graham as follows:

1. On the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action of the
Amended Complaint for the sum of $5,841.57, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal
rate from May 15, 2001, relating to the Hamlet check claim; $2,148.00, plus prejudgment interest at the legal rate from August 19, 2001, relating to the secret profits
for renting generators claim; and $7,517.59, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal rate
from August 28, 2001, with respect to Burton Lumber's personal property converted by
Graham;
2. The Third and Fourth Causes of Action of the Amended Complaint for fraud
are dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action;
3. The Amended Counterclaim, and each purported claim for relief contained
therein, is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action;
4. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover punitive damages in an amount to be
determined after a further hearing;
5. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees incurred
herein in an amount to be subsequently determined; and
6. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover its taxable costs incurred herein.
DATED this y&

day ofjuty, 2005.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following on
the *3& day ofltriy, 2005:
David G. Harlow, Esq.
1855 North Oak Lane
Provo, Utah 84604
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ADDENDUM E
AGREEMENT BETWEEN BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE CO. AND MICHAEL GRAHAM DATED
FEBRUARY 28,2001

AGREEMENT
This Agreement entered into as of the 28 th day of February 2001 by and between Burton
Lumber & Hardware Co. (referred to in this Agreement as "Buyer"), and Michael Graham,
owner of a sole proprietorship known as Advanced Home Systems (referred to in this Agreement
as "Seller or Graham").
RECITALS
WHEREAS, Seller is presently in the business of doing construction and operating a
panelizing plant in Utah County (herein the "Business"); and
WHEREAS, Buyer desires to purchase all of the assets of Seller and acquire the business
operations of Seller.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the representations, warranties, covenants and
agreements contained herein, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the
parties agree as follows:
1. Sale and Transfer of Assets. Seller shall sell, transfer, convey and deliver to Buyer
at the Closing provided for at Paragraph 3 hereof, all of the following assets owned by Seller and
used in the Business (hereinafter collectively the "Assets"):
1. i Fixed Assets. All assets shown on a separate asset schedule to be prepared by
Seller which includes all equipment,fixtures,machinery, tools, furniture, furnishings, shop
supplies, inventory, and all other tangible personal property, use and located at the Business (the
"Fixed Assets"). The Fixed Assets shall befreeand clear of all liens, claims and encumbrances
and shall not be subject to lease or conditional sales agreements
1.2 Inventory. All Inventory held by Seller for re-sale at the Business as of the
Closing Date (the "Inventory"). The Inventory shall be conveyed in merchantable condition and
shall be free and clear of all liens and encumbrances at the Closing Date.
1.3 Purchase Orders and Sale Contracts. All of Seller's rights in and to any
purchase orders and sales contracts in process as of the Closing Date. A list of the purchase
orders and sales contracts shall be delivered at the Closing.
1.4 Intangible Assets. The following intangible assets: All plans,files,customer
lists, and information relating to Seller's customers; employee lists; the telephone listing and
telephone number for Seller, Seller's post office box, and all warranty and contract rights
associated with the Assets (the "Intangible Assets"). The rights in such Intangible Assets shall
not be subject to any claims or encumbrances or liens of any type and shall be conveyed without
reservation of rights.
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1.5 Accounts Receivable and Payable. Seller shall retain all of his accounts
receivable. It is understood that under no circumstances shall Buyer be entitled to collect any of
these accounts receivable. Seller shall be responsible to pay all of his accounts payable on or
before the date of closing. It is understood that under no circumstances shall Buyer be
responsible to pay any of these accounts payable.
1.6 Excluded Assets. Except for accounts receivable and personal assets of
Graham such as his home, furniture, cars, and clothing there are no excluded assets. Buyer is
purchasing all assets of Seller.
1.7 Title. Seller shall sell and convey good and marketable title to the Assets,
free and clear of any liabilities, obligations, liens and encumbrances. The tangible personal
property described herein shall be conveyed by Bill of Sale, a copy of which is attached as
Exhibit A. Transfers of contracts and agreements shall be by a simple assignment.
1.8 Panelizing Division. After closing, Buyer shall establish a Panelizing
Division where Michael Graham will work. Buyer will separately track profits earned and/or
losses incurred by this Division on, at least, a quarterly basis.
1.9 Cessation of Advanced Home Systems Business. After closing, Advanced
Home Systems will immediately cease doing business. From the date of closing forward, any
panelizing business previously performed by Advanced Home Systems and/or Michael Graham
personally will then be performed by the Panelizing Division of Buyer. This does not preclude
Graham from transferring Advanced Home Systems' Contractor's license to his personal name.
2. Purchase Price and Payment. The purchase price for the assets and payment
therefor shall be as follows:
2.1 Initial Purchase Price. Seller shall provide Buyer with a list of all assets to be
purchased by Buyer as set forth in paragraph 1 above at least 5 days prior to Closing. The list
(asset schedule) shall specify Seller's estimated fair market value for the assets. At Closing
Buyer shall pay Seller an agreed upon price for the fair market value of the assets. If the parties
cannot agree upon the value of the assets, no Closing will take place and this agreement will be
null and void.
2.2 Contingent Deferred Purchase Price. 50% of the pretax profits of Buyer's
Panelizing Division will be paid to Seller annually in February of each year for the three year
period beginning January 1, 2001 and ending December 31, 2003. The February payments will
be for profits earned from January 1 through December 31 of the preceding year. However, if
there are no profits during a particular period, Graham will be entitled to no additional money
during that period. Annual losses incurred by the Panelizing Division, if any, will be rolled
forward and will offset future annual profits. If Seller receives $500,000 from Buyer before the
three year period specified herein expires, including the moneys paid pursuant to paragraph 2.1
above, Seller shall be entitled to no additional compensation hereunder. In other words, it is
understood and agreed the $500,000 is the maximum that Seller will ever receive from Buyer for
the sale of his business. Payments specified above are subject to and governed by the provisions
of Paragraph 7.4 hereof.
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3. Closing. The Closing of this transaction shall take place at 2220 So. State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah on or before March 6, 2001, (The "Closing Date"), or at such other time or place
as may be agreed upon by the parties. At the Closing:
3.1 Bill of Sale. Seller shall execute and deliver the Bill of Sale to Buyer.
3.2 Assignment of Intangible Assets. Seller shall deliver to Buyer assignments of
such contracts, agreements and rights as may be deemed reasonably necessary by Buyer to effect
the transfer of the Intangible Assets.
3.3 Assumption of Lease. Seller shall provide Buyer with a copy of the lease for
the property and building that Seller is currently utilizing at least 5 days prior to closing. If
agreeable to Buyer, Buyer shall assume all of Seller's obligations under the lease at the time of
closing.
3.4 Further Assurances. From time to time after the Closing, Seller and Buyer
shall, at the reasonable request of either party and without further consideration, execute and
deliver such other bills of sale, assignments, consents, releases, assurances in law, assumptions,
and other instruments as the parties may reasonably deem necessary or desirable to vest, perfect
or confirm title to any of the assets or rights acquired by reason of the transaction described in
this Agreement, or to put Buyer in possession of any of the Assets, or to confirm the nature of
the transaction, assumption of obligations or otherwise as required.
3.5 Records and Information. Seller will provide to Buyer copies of such of
Seller's business records as may reasonably be required by Buyer for the conduct of its on-going
business.
4. Representations and Warranties of Seller. Seller hereby represents and warrants to
Buyer that:
4.1 Legal Existence. Advanced Home Systems is a sole proprietorship owned
exclusively by Michael Graham, is in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah, is duly
qualified to transact business in the State of Utah, and has all powers and all material
government licenses, authorizations, consents and approvals required to carry on business as it is
now conducted.
4.2 Ability to Carry Out Agreement. Seller is not a party to, subject to, or bound
by any agreement, judgment, order, writ, injunction or decree of any court or government body
which could prevent or materially impair the carrying out of this Agreement for the sale of the
Assets.
4.3 Binding Effect. This Agreement constitutes a valid and binding agreement of
Seller. When executed, the conveyance of the Assets will transfer title to the Assets, free and
clear of any liens, claims and encumbrances.
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4.4 Financial Information. Seller has provided to Buyer such of its unaudited
financial information as requested by Buyer upon which Buyer has relied for purposes of
entering into this Agreement.
4.5 Conduct of Business Prior to Closing. Except as otherwise provided herein
or agreed to in writing by Buyer, on and after the date of this Agreement and until the Closing
Date, Seller will carry on its business and activities in substantially the same manner as
heretofore and will not make and has not made any purchases, sales or agreements therefor, or
introduced any method of management or operation in respect to its business and its activities or
its assets, except for purchases of inventory in the ordinary course of its business and sales
thereof Seller will use its purchases of inventory in the ordinary course of its business and sales
thereof. Seller will use its reasonable efforts to maintain and preserve its business organization
intact and maintain its relationships with employees, suppliers and customers and others having
business relations with it, so that they will be preserved for Buyer on and after the Closing Date.
Further, Seller will not make any changes or modifications in any of the contracts it has, except
in the ordinary course of business.
4.6 Payment of Taxes and Other Obligations of Seller. Seller shall pay when due
all current and past due liabilities relating to his business or operations. At the time of closing,
Seller will not owe any taxes or any other debts to any other creditors associated in any way with
his business. Seller shall further perform and take any and all actions as may be required of
Seller under the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Specifically, Seller shall compile or
assist in the compilation of any and all lists or information required to be provided by Seller
pursuant to this Agreement.
4.7 Employees. Seller shall assist Buyer in maintaining the relations and
employment of the employees of Seller to the extent requested by Buyer.
5. Representations and Warranties of Buyer. Buyer represents and warrants to Seller
that:
5.1 Organization. Buyer is a corporation organized, validly existing, and in good
standing under the laws of the State of Utah.
5.2 Authorization and Approval of Agreement. Buyer's board of directors has
authorized the execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement by Buyer. This
Agreement, when executed, shall constitute the binding obligation of Buyer.
5.3 Ability to Carry Out Agreement. Buyer is not a party to, subject to, or bound
by, any agreement, judgment, order, writ, injunction, or decree of any court or governmental
body that, when enforced, would prevent the carrying out of this Agreement.
6. Survival of Representations and Warranties. Notwithstanding any investigation
made at any time by or on behalf of any of the parties, all of the covenants, representations,
warranties, agreements and undertakings contained in this Agreement and in any separate
instruments delivered hereunder, shall survive the Closing Date.
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7. Employment Issues. Following closing, Buyer shall employ Graham subject to the
following conditions:
7.1 Employees at Will. Graham is an employee at will who, at the time of
closing, shall sign a separate Acknowledgement that is attached hereto as Exhibit B. The parties
understand and agree that nothing contained in this Agreement or in any other document shall
have the effect of altering or changing Graham's status as an employee at will.
7.2 Compensation. Graham shall be paid a salary of $60,000 per year plus a
bonus of $15,000 per quarter during the time he is employed by Buyer. Graham must be
employed by Buyer at the time a bonus is due to be entitled to receive the bonus. Bonuses will be
paid in April, July, October, and January for the quarters ending March 31, June 30, September
30, and December 31. Additionally, Buyer will lease a truck for Graham's use at a price not to
exceed $40,000 within 30 days from the date of Closing. If Graham quits his employment with
Seller, he shall have no right to continue to use of the truck and must surrender possession of the
truck to Buyer immediately. If Graham is fired without just cause, he shall be entitled to keep the
truck and Buyer will deliver title to the truck to him free and clear of all liens and/or
encumbrances. The payment of salaries and bonuses specified herein are in addition to any
payments Graham is entitled to receive under the provisions of paragraph 2.2 above.
7.3 Best Efforts. Graham will use his best efforts to insure the success of the
Burton Lumber Panelizing Division. He shall work full time for Seller, and shall not work in
other business pursuits.
7.4 Termination of Employment. If the employment of Graham is terminated for
any reason, he will immediately forfeit any unpaid portion of the remaining contingent deferred
purchase price specified in Paragraph 2.2 above, plus he will no longer be entitled to any
continuing salary, allowances, and bonuses.
8. Expenses and Fees. The parties agree that they shall each pay their own respective
expenses, including, without limitation, fees, disbursements and expenses of their attorneys,
accountants, and advisors in connection with the negotiation and preparation of this Agreement
and the transactions contemplated by it. Neither party has engaged a broker, consultant or other
person who is owed a fee as a result of the consummation of this Agreement. To the extent
either party shall incur a fee from any broker or consultant pursuant to this Agreement, the party
who has incurred the fee or expense shall indemnify and hold harmless the other from any claims
or costs resulting therefrom.
9 Indemnity. All of the representations, warranties, and covenants in this Agreement
and the obligations of the parties with respect thereto shall survive the Closing. Seller agrees
that he will indemnify, defend, protect and hold harmless Buyer and its employees from and
against all liabilities, claims, damages, actions, demands, assessments, adjustments, penalties,
losses, costs and expenses whatsoever (including court costs and attorneys' fees) that arise as a
result of or incident to the following: occurrences before the Closing Date; any breach of,
misrepresentation in, untruth in or inaccuracy in the representations and warranties by Seller;
non-fulfillment or nonperformance of any agreement, covenant or condition on the part of Seller
made in this Agreement or an any other document delivered pursuant to this Agreement.
5
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10. Miscellaneous.
10.1 Notices. Any notice or other communication required or permitted
hereunder shall be in writing and shall be delivered personally, sent by Facsimile transmission or
sent by certified, registered or express mail, postage prepaid. Any such notice shall be deemed
given when so delivered personally, or sent by facsimile transmission or, if mailed, four (4) days
after the date of deposit in the United States mails, as follows:
If to Buyer To:
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co.
ATTN: Robert A. Burton
2220 So. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
If to Seller To:
Michael Graham

Any party may, by notice given in accordance with this Paragraph to the other parties, designate
another address or person for receipt of notice hereunder.
10.2 Entire Agreement. The Agreement contains the entire agreement among the
parties and supersedes all prior agreements, written or oral, with respect thereto.
10.3 Waivers and Amendments: Non-Contractual Remedies: Preservation of
Remedies. This Agreement may be amended, superseded, canceled, renewed or extended, and
the terms hereof may be waived, only by a written instrument signed by the parties or, in the case
of a waiver, by the party waiving compliance. No delay on the part of any party in exercising
any right, power or privilege hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof. Nor shall any waiver
on the part of any party of any such right, power or privilege, nor any single or partial exercise of
any such right, power or privilege, preclude any further exercise thereof or the exercise thereof
of any other such right, power or privilege. The rights and remedies herein provided are
cumulative and are not exclusive of any rights or remedies that any party may otherwise have at
law or in equity. The rights and remedies of any party based upon, arising out of or otherwise in
respect of any inaccuracy in or breach of any representation, warranty, covenant or agreement
contained in this Agreement shall in no way be limited by the fact that the act, omission,
occurrence or other state of facts upon which any claim of any such inaccuracy or breach is
based may also be the subject matter of any other representation, warranty, covenant or
agreement contained in this Agreement (or in any other agreement between the parties) as to
which there is no inaccuracy or breach.
10.4 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
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10.5 Binding Effect; No Assignment. This Agreement shall be binding upon and
inure to the benefit of the parties and their respective successors and assigns and legal
representatives. This Agreement is not assignable except by operation of law.
10.6 No Third Party Beneficiaries. Nothing in this Agreement is intended or
shall be construed to give any person, other than the parties hereto, any legal or equitable right,
remedy or claims under or in respect of this Agreement or any provision contained herein.
10 7 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed by the parties hereto in
separate counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be an original, but all
such counterparts shall together constitute one and the same instrument. Each counterpart may
consist of a number of copies hereof each signed by less than all, but together signed by all of the
parties hereto.
10.8 Headings. The headings in this Agreement are for reference only, and shall
not affect the interpretation of this Agreement.
10.9. Survival of Representations and Warranties. All representations,
warranties, agreements, covenants and obligations herein or in any schedule, certificate or
financial statement delivered by Seller to Buyer incident to the transactions contemplated hereby
are material, shall be deemed to have been relied upon by the other parties, shall survive the
execution hereof regardless of any investigation and shall not merge in the performance of any
obligation by any party hereto.
10.10. Severability. If any provisions of this Agreement shall be held to be
invalid, illegal or unenforceable, the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining
provisions shall not in any way be affected or impaired thereby.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed or have caused this Agreement to be
signed by their respective officers who are duly authorized.
BUYER:
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE CO.
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EXHIBIT A
GEiNERAL CONVEYANCE, ASSIGNMENT AND BELL OF SALE
Effective as of March 6, 2001, Michael Graham ("Grantor"), for good and valuable
consideration and pursuant to that Purchase and Sale of Assets Agreement dated as of March 6,
2001 (the "Purchase Agreement"), between Graham and Burton Lumber and Hardware Co.,
("Grantee"), hereby sells, assigns, transfers, conveys and delivers to Grantee all of Grantor's
right, title and interest in all of the Assets (except for the Accounts Receivable).
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all such Assets unto Grantee and its successors and assigns
to and for its or their use forever.
Grantor and Grantee shall execute and deliver, at the request of the other, such farther
instruments of transfer, and shall take or cause to be taken such other or further actions, as shall
reasonably be requested for purposes of carrying out the Transactions.
This General Conveyance, Assignment and Bill of Sale is delivered pursuant to Section
1.7 of the Purchase Agreement and shall be construed consistently with the Purchase Agreement.
Capitalized terms used in this instrument shall have the meanings given them in the Purchase
Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Grantor and Grantee have executed and delivered this
General Conveyance, Assignment and Bill of Sale effective as of the date first above written.

Grantor:

i
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I have received a copy of the Company's Policies, Practices,
Benefits and Programs Manual dated December 1, 1997, and I
understand its contents. I agree to adhere to the policies and
practices set forth in the manual.
I understand that the manual is intended to provide an
overview of the Company's policies and procedures and does not
necessarily represent all such policies or procedures.
I understand, further, that the Company may unilaterally, at
any time, without notice to me, add, delete, or alter any
policies, procedures, benefits or programs in and at its sole
discretion. I understand that nothing in the Company's manual
guarantees me employment with the Company for any set period of
time, in any specific position, or at any specific rate of pay.
I understand that my employment and compensation are for no
fixed term and that my employment is "at-will" and may be
terminated by the Company at any time with or without cause or
notice. I also understand that the company is not legally bound
to follow any guideline concerning warnings or other procedures
connected with any disciplinary action, including but not limited
to termination, that the Company may wish to take with respect to
my employment.
I also acknowledge that there are no oral or written
understandings or agreements with respect to any aspect of my
employment with the company. I agree that no oral statements
made by anyone may ever constitute an agreement or understanding
with respect to my employment which c^uitf^evex^alter my status as
an "at-will" employee.
DATE :
SIGNATURE:
PRINT NAME:
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